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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LABOR VISCERALITY? WORK STOPPAGES IN THE “NEW
WORK” NON-UNION ECONOMY
MICHAEL C. DUFF*
ABSTRACT
COVID-19 work stoppages involving employees refusing to work because
they are fearful of contracting coronavirus provide a recent dramatic
opportunity for newer workplace law observers to grasp a well-established legal
rule: both unionized and non-union employees possess rights to engage in work
stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). This article
explains that employees engaging in concerted work stoppages, in good faith
reaction to health and safety dangers, are prima facie protected from discharge.
The article carefully distinguishes between NLRA § 7 and § 502 work stoppages.
Crucially, and contrary to § 502 work stoppages, the health and safety-related
work stoppages of non-union employees protected by NLRA § 7 are not subject
to an “objective reasonableness” test.
Having analyzed the general legal protection of non-union work stoppages
and noting that work stoppages had already been on the rise during the
preceding two years, the article considers when legal protection may be
withdrawn from work stoppages because employees repeatedly and
unpredictably engage in them—so called “unprotected intermittent strikes.”
Discussing a recent National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) decision that
could be misinterpreted, the article argues for an updated and strengthened
presumption of work stoppage protection for employees wholly unaffiliated with
a union who engage in repeated work stoppages that are arguably
“intermittent.” The law should presume that the work stoppages of unorganized
employees are not part of an illegitimate plan to drive an employer “into a state
of confusion.”
Next, the article grapples with looming work stoppage issues emerging from
expansion of the Gig economy. When workers are not “employees,” peaceful
work stoppages may increasingly become subject to federal court injunctions.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act (the venerable 1932 federal anti-injunction law) does
not by its terms apply to non-employees—possibly including putative non* Winston S. Howard Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.
My Thanks to Professors Jeffrey Hirsch and Michael Oswalt for commenting on earlier drafts of
the article. All errors are mine.
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employee Gig workers—raising the specter of a new era of “Government by
Injunction.” Under existing antitrust law, non-employee workers may be viewed
as “independent businesspeople” colluding through work stoppages to “fix
prices.” The article argues that First Amendment avoidance principles should
guide Sherman Act interpretation when “non-employee” worker activity does
not resemble price fixing; that, consistent with liability principles articulated in
the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Sessions v. Dimaya, antitrust law’s
severe penalties should not be applied to Gig workers given the ambiguities in
federal and state law employee definitions.
Finally, the article considers the potential for individual non-union private
arbitration agreements to curtail the NLRA rights of employees to engage in
work stoppages in light of the Supreme Court’s labor law-diminishing opinion
in Epic Systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about work stoppages, events at the fulcrum of American labor
relations policy. A conception of “labor relations” that imagines a perpetual
street-chess-match between “labor” and “management” in which two “eternal”
antagonists 1 are rationally planning their next moves leaves much to be desired. 2
A better understanding of labor relations is that of a never-ending, visceral
encounter between people of very different social and economic stations and
statuses periodically—often in times of broader social crisis—hurling
themselves against each other to the point of exhaustion. 3 The ensuing stasis
produced by the exhaustion demarks the temporary boundaries of the law.
Justificatory rules emerge later. COVID-19 disease may be this generation’s
“labor” crisis because many workers have resisted working during a pandemic. 4
It is, of course, tidy when labor antagonists conform themselves to facially
elegant rules. It is also unusual. For, rules or no rules, lawful or unlawful, when
workers get mad enough (or scared enough) about their working conditions, they
may simply stop working; if they are ordered to wade into a pandemic, they may
simply refuse. 5 What else but to engage in work stoppages or to engage in mass
picketing can they do? 6 But especially if not represented by a union, these
workers may not know (and temporarily, as a result of inflamed passions, may
not care to know) the legal risks entailed in particular courses of action. Indeed,
given the rapidly transforming legal terrain of the “new economy,” the “old
economy” law governing labor disputes may be very difficult to apply, exposing

1. See generally Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 167 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (noting an eternal conflict between man, who desires to get the most he can for his
service, and society, which desires to get the services for the least possible expense).
2. See Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and
Industrial Strike Activity,
59 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 36 (1969) (noting a “presumption in some of the literature that a breakdown
of negotiations cannot occur if the two parties are ‘rational’”).
3. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081–82.
4. Aaron Gordon, Lauren Kaori Gurley, Edward Ongweso Jr, and Jordan Pearson,
Coronavirus Is a Labor Crisis, and a General Strike Might Be Next, VICE (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z3b9ny/coronavirus-general-strike [https://perma.cc/73MDSEFC].
5. Mike Elk, Defying Trump’s Order, Nebraska Meatpackers Strike – PA National Guard
Replaces Striking Nurses – Richmond Threatens to Fire Striking Bus Drivers, PAYDAY REPORT
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://paydayreport.com/defying-trumps-order-nebraska-meatpackers-strike-panational-guard-replaces-striking-nurses-richmond-threatens-to-fire-striking-nurses/ [https://perma.
cc/U6XK-G73S].
6. As Ahmed White has argued, it is easy to see the suppression of such tactics as “labor’s
undoing.” Ahmed A. White, Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass Picketing and the
Dilemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 59, 63 (2014). While it is true
employees could “quit employment,” the option is hardly compelling, particularly where working
conditions are universally bad.
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labor activists to enhanced risks of job loss or legal liability. 7 The old economy
work-stoppage 8 rules were difficult enough even when workers who were
unambiguously “employees”—unionized employees at that—were engaged in
“classical” labor disputes. 9
Once upon a time, for example, when this writer was a much younger man,
he found himself suddenly in the midst of a “wildcat strike” 10 in Philadelphia.
A union-activist co-worker had been fired on the job on—many were
convinced—trumped-up charges. In response to the firing, about four hundred
Teamster-represented airline fleet service agents walked off the job, leaving
many jet aircraft and passengers stranded at their gates. It was a dramatic scene.
This writer had been a union shop steward for just a few weeks and will never
forget how rapidly the scene unfolded, how little he knew about the “rules of the
game” in such situations, and how much even a little more knowledge could
have helped him. The work stoppage violated a no-strike pledge in the collective
bargaining agreement governing the workplace and was likely illegal, 11 though
few employees lost their jobs. 12
When union stewards are nonplussed by the potentially unplanned and sheer
animal energy of a work stoppage, the possible confusion becomes evident for
relatively unsophisticated non-union employees, especially those in which the

7. As will be developed, infra, the “old economy” is one that consisted of workers acting
concertedly as “employees” who were not bound by arbitration agreements and who were much
more likely than at present to be represented by unions.
8. A work-stoppage, when initiated by employees, is a strike. See Work Stoppages, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/wsp/questions-and-answers.htm#Ques
tion_5 [https://perma.cc/3HUV-29ZV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
9. The right to strike is protected activity under §§ 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations
Act but the “lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing,
or on the conduct of the strikers.” See The Right to Strike, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nl
rb.gov/strikes [https://perma.cc/KE72-4ED2] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
10. A wildcat strike is a “work stoppage undertaken by employees without the consent of their
respective unions. Such strikes are not necessarily illegal, but they often violate terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. The name is based on the stereotypical characteristics associated with
wildcats: unpredictability and uncontrollability.” See ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britanni
ca.com/topic/wildcat-strike [https://perma.cc/W9UM-3X3H] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). As an
aside, this 80s-era strike may have foreshadowed changing structural dynamics in an emerging
precarious work economy: the fired and striking employees were in the lower-tier of a two-tier
wage structure, earning roughly ten dollars per hour less than their upper-tier co-workers. The strike
was unwise from a legal perspective, but perhaps inevitable.
11. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 385
(1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 247–48 (1970) (discussing unprotected
strikes in context of no-strike pledges in collective bargaining agreements). The intense solidarity
of the local union members at the center of the drama—Local 732, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (Airline Division)—made even legally permissible discharges difficult because of the
real risk of generating additional work stoppages.
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employee status of workers is not clear. 13 Union stewards know about the
general right of employees to strike and may even have vague intuitions about
legal qualifications of that right; certainly, they will know that workers are
statutory employees with collective bargaining rights.14 One doubts the same
knowledge or intuitions are held by workers in a wide variety of non-union
workplaces in which, among other factors, employee status is unclear given the
hazy outlines of the “Gig economy.” 15 Contemporary commentators observe
that “workers involved in today’s labor struggles, are outlining the blueprint of
a new labor law—a labor law that moves away from narrow, bureaucratic, and
legalistic forms of worker representation toward more sectoral, worker-driven,
and political forms of organization.” 16 Implicit in this observation, in the very
idea of a labor “struggle,” is an understanding that new “sectoral, worker-driven,
and political forms of organization” will be fiercely resisted by employers or
others who use labor. 17 Most recently, a wide variety of COVID-19-related
workplace disputes have highlighted the need for a better understanding of the
complicated legal terrain upon which the new economy is built. A terrain that
includes gig workers and the expansion of compulsory arbitration of workplace
disputes in non-union workplaces. 18
In all workplaces, if history is a guide, work stoppages starkly and abruptly
coalesce employee grievances and expedite employers’ attention to them. 19
International law implicitly recognizes work stoppages as a logical outgrowth of
the freedom of association of workers. 20 Along similar lines, commentators

13. See generally infra Part II.
14. See NLRB. v. City Disposals Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 844 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing relative sophistication of union shop stewards on labor law matters in the
workplace when compared to rank-and-file workers).
15. See discussion infra Part 0.
16. Kate Andrias, Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Age of
Trump, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135, 148 (2019) (hereinafter “Peril and Possibility”).
17. Beginning in about the last two decades of the twentieth century it has become clear that
employer resistance to labor organization has increased with innovations in the American economy
and increased product competition. Henry S. Farber, The Decline of Unionization in the United
States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?, 8 J. LAB. ECON. S75, S76 (1990).
18. Robert Combs, Analysis: COVID-19 Has Workers Striking. Where Are the Unions?,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 14, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/anal
ysis-COVID-19-has-workers-striking-where-are-the-unions [https://perma.cc/DBN3-YNVP].
19. See Strike, NEW WORLD ENCYC. (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.newworldencyclopedia
.org/entry/Strike.
20. The view is not without detractors. For arguments that the right exists, see Bernard
Gernigon, Alberto Odero, and Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right To Strike,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (1998), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—-normes/documents/publication/wcms_087987.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EQ-A4LW].
See also Janice R. Bellace, The ILO and the Right to Strike, 153 INT’L LAB. REV. 29, 47–48 (2014)
(tracing the distillation of the right to strike under international law to the distillation of the right

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

120

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:115

question whether federal labor law would ever have emerged without a
continuous, credible threat by workers of widespread interruptions of
production. 21 Whether labor insurgency, especially in the form of work
stoppages, represents reflexive viscerality, romantic folly, or a constructive road
to freedom, 22 it is what workers have done throughout history in reaction to
adverse working conditions. 23 In recent times, even before COVID-19 events,
the Economic Policy Institute reported that workers in the United States were
increasingly engaging in strike activity:
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) show that there was an upsurge
in major strike activity in 2018 and 2019, marking a 35-year high for the number
of workers involved in a major work stoppage over a two-year period. Further,
2019 recorded the greatest number of work stoppages involving 20,000 or more
workers since at least 1993, when the BLS started providing data that made it
possible to track work stoppages by size. 24

Work stoppages may take new forms in the present technological era. If
work is assigned by way of electronic “app,” for example, workers may refuse
the assignment or may feign compliance with it. Workers may also utilize
technology to engage in concerted protests short of work stoppages. As
Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has noted, “[w]idespread Internet availability in the
workplace has provided unions with an important tool—which they have
actively used—to organize and communicate with employees, especially those

from the United Nations Right of Freedom of Association under the Freedom of Association
Convention No. 87).
21. Professor Alan Hyde has written that “the transformative labor reforms with which we
deal were indeed payoffs to insurgent working classes, though the word ‘payoff’ is not the one I
would normally use. Moreover, the payoffs were not necessarily guided by notions of efficiency or
the public good.” Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 429 (1990);
see also Ashenfelter and Johnson, supra note 2, at 35 (“Most union ‘power’ is derived from the
threat of [the] strike . . .”).
22. See James G. Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941, 942 (1997)
(discussing the right to strike as an essential part of labor’s conception of its own liberty).
23. JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 12 (1972).
24. Heidi Shierholz and Margaret Poydock, Continued Surge in Strike Activity Signals Worker
Dissatisfaction with Wage Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publi
cation/continued-surge-in-strike-activity/ [https://perma.cc/85Y9-5E5T]. “BLS data on major work
stoppages–work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers lasting one shift or longer—show that
425,500 workers were involved in major work stoppages that began in 2019.” Id. A breakdown of
2019 work stoppages and employers involved includes North Carolina public school teachers
(92,700); General Motors automotive workers (46,000); West Virginia public school teachers
(36,400); Los Angeles public school teachers (33,000); Chicago public school teachers (32,000);
Stop & Shop workers (31,000); University of California service and medical center workers
(25,000); Kentucky public school teachers (22,900); Oregon public school teachers (20,400);
AT&T workers (20,000). Id.
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who are difficult to reach through traditional means.” 25 Even as technology is
driving changes in labor organizing, protest, or other exercises of concerted
activities, 26 work stoppages are where the “rubber hits the road” when agreement
between workers and employers or other labor users over important working
conditions cannot be achieved, as COVID-19 events have reemphasized. 27
As workers increasingly engage in work stoppages, the question arises as to
what legal constructs will await them given new modes of industrial
organization in the economy. Assessing this new employment landscape, one
might first want to know how employers will preliminarily react to work
stoppages. It has been somewhat surprising, for example, when public sector
school teachers, engaging in often unlawful strikes over the last few years, have
not been uniformly fired, as they legally might have been. 28 Perhaps this resulted
from a high degree of community support for the teachers in some states. 29 Or
perhaps public employers were simply “rusty” at deploying the “economic
weapons” the law has historically afforded them. 30 Leaving to one side
25. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 262, 274 (2008).
26. Id. at 274-75.
27. Joshua Freeman, Pandemics Can Mean Strike Waves, JACOBIN (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-strike-wave-spanish-flu [https://per
ma.cc/T872-CFK5] (pointing out that during the Spanish Flu pandemic in 1919, four million
workers struck, which at the time represented one-fifth of the workforce).
28. See Andrias, supra note 16, at 141-144. Teacher strikes are illegal in most states. Milla
Sanes and John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States, CTR.
ECON. AND POL’Y RSCH., Chart 3, at 8 (2014), https://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-201403.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WC9-KBZG].
29. In West Virginia, for example, “students walked picket lines with teachers, and
superintendents in all 55 counties closed schools every day for seven days in support of the teachers.
This prevented the walkouts from turning into an actual strike, which would have been illegal for
teachers to perform in West Virginia.” Kate Cimini, Teacher Strikes are Illegal in West Virginia
. . . So How Did They Strike?, MEDILL NEWS SERV. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://dc.medill.north
western.edu/blog/2018/03/08/67017/#sthash.9CKm29hN.dpbs [https://perma.cc/29US-JJ2U] (last
visited Aug. 21, 2020).
30. Other examples of this phenomenon exist. Many readers will be familiar with strikes by
New York metro workers in apparent violation of the Taylor Law that did not result in employee
discharges. See Nicole Gelinas, Putting Teeth in the Taylor Law, CITY J. (Dec. 14, 2005),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/putting-teeth-taylor-law-10137.html [https://perma.cc/MLE5-A
MAV]. The development nevertheless seemed surprising because of some of the conservative states
in which strikes were occurring like Oklahoma, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arizona. See Eric
Levitz, The Teachers’ Strikes Have Exposed the GOP’s Achilles Heel, INTELLIGENCER (April 5,
2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/the-teachers-strikes-have-exposed-the-gops-achil
les-heel.html [https://perma.cc/68YQ-VVU6]. There has been some indication that state
legislatures were attempting to “tighten up” state anti-strike laws in the summer of 2019 in the wake
of successful strikes. See Jake Wartel, States Push Anti-Protest Bills In Response to Teachers’
Strikes, DEFENDING RTS. & DISSENT (Jun. 13, 2019), https://rightsanddissent.org/news/states-push
-anti-protest-bills-in-response-to-teachers-strikes/ [https://perma.cc/Y2NN-SH5K].
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employers’ preliminary, spontaneous responses to work stoppages, legal
analysis of work stoppages must confront systemic, “new economy” legal
complexities and reconsider the de facto legal status quo.
Three such especially pressing complexities surrounding work stoppages in
the “new work” economy warrant extended discussion, for they suggest new
arguments problematizing the lawfulness of work stoppages. Merely
questioning the rights of workers to engage in work stoppages may have a
chilling effect on worker organization, especially among the most fearful and
precarious workers.
First, although non-union employees have long possessed the right to
engage in work stoppages under the NLRA 31 a principle relevant to recent nonunion, safety-related COVID-19 work stoppages and to the Google Walkout of
2018, 32 the NLRB arguably expanded a rule forbidding “intermittent strikes,”
which could more easily render non-union work stoppages unprotected under
the NLRA. 33 Under the rule, non-union employees possess the right to engage
in work stoppages, but multiple work stoppages may at a certain point become
unprotected if part of a “plan” is to drive an employer into a “state of
confusion.” 34 The lines drawn by the NLRB are fine, and the potential for
confusion is high over this slippery doctrine, especially among unsophisticated
workers. This article will contend that “intermittency doctrine” should be
sparingly applied to non-union employees. 35 As the COVID-19 work stoppages
have demonstrated, panic by workers over repeated risk of exposure to
dangerous disease is not part of a “plan,” and reactive work stoppages of this
type should never be denied NLRA protection under an intermittency theory
when the employees involved are not members of a union.

31. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2018); see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–
13 (1962); see also 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2018). It is also true, however, that in a number of contexts
“[l]abor picketing, labor boycotts, and union associational activity are all routinely curbed by the
state.” Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 533
(2018), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2017/iss1/20 [https://perma.cc/EP7A-29Z2].
32. See Johana Bhuiyan, The Google Walkout: What protesters Demanded and What They
Got, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2019-1106/google-walkout-demands [https://perma.cc/YRX3-E378] (“On Nov. 1, 2018, some 20,000
Google employees walked off the job in protest of the company’s handling of sexual harassment
allegations.”).
33. Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B No. 24 (July 25, 2019). Walmart will be discussed infra
Section II.C. The qualifier “may have” refers to an odd situation in which critical facts were
stipulated in a manner calling into question the rule that was actually established. Nevertheless,
employers may be under the impression that “intermittent strike doctrine” firmly applies in the
context of non-union workplaces, a proposition with which the article will contend.
34. See infra. at Part II.
35. Id.
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A second legal complexity centers on the national legal uncertainty and
volatility over which workers qualify as “employees.” 36 The employee
definition is crucially important for labor law because only employees are
protected by the NLRA 37 and only employees explicitly possess the right to
engage in work stoppages. 38 Additionally, federal courts are normally prevented
from issuing injunctions to suspend work stoppages in peaceful, private-sector
labor disputes involving employees. 39 If only employee work stoppages are
protected from federal court injunctions, 40 even peaceful strikes and picketing
by non-employee workers—such as independent contractors or other types of
Gig economy workers—could be lawfully enjoined at the federal level. 41 This
development could open the possibility of a new era of “Government by
injunction” in which federal injunctions effectively quash nascent worker
organizing. 42
Conjoined to renewed potential for federal courts quashing peaceful work
stoppages over working conditions is the issue of whether non-employee
workers could be subject to antitrust liability for engaging in work stoppages. 43
The question takes on heightened importance as increasing numbers of workers
in the Gig economy are classified by companies as independent contractors. 44
36. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of
Employees and Employers Who Operate In the Borderland Between an Employer and Employee
Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 608 (2012) (observing that legal definition of “employee”
is unclear and arguing that the “lack of clarity is largely due to the fact that the statutory language
defining employee status in virtually all of our nation’s employment laws is vague, conclusory, and
largely useless.”)
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 (2018); Kerry Rittich, Between Workers’ Rights and Flexibility:
Labor Law in an Uncertain World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 565, 572 (2010) (“Contractualized work
relations, for example, mean that many workers engaged in precarious and contingent work are
legally designated as independent contractors and have no entitlement to bargain collectively.”).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157, 163 (2018).
39. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2018); see discussion infra Part III.B.
41. Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of U.S. and Can. (AFLCIO), 353 F.2d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
42. For the classic discussion of the role of labor injunctions in early 20th century labor
disputes, see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
43. Antitrust jurisdiction is one of the better historical examples of when federal courts have
been in a position to enjoin peaceful work stoppages. See infra Part III. B.
44. Yuki Noguchi, Freelanced: The Rise of the Contract Workforce, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan.
22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578825135/rise-of-the-contract-workers-work-is-dif
ferent-now [https://perma.cc/LVQ4-HGJT] (“NPR/Marist poll finds that 1 in 5 jobs in America is
held by a worker under contract.”). There is some dispute as to the actual number of independent
contractors given reporting by the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggesting that independent
contractors made up only 6.9% of the workforce as of 2017. Independent Contractors Made Up
6.9 Percent of Employment in May 2017, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2018/independent-contractors-made-up-6-point-9-percent-of-employment-in-may-2017.htm
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Early in the twentieth century, labor activity conducted through unions was often
deemed by courts “a conspiracy in restraint of trade,” in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 45 Through long historical development, labor activity was
substantially “exempted” from antitrust law. 46 The question now is whether
widespread use of independent contractors in place of “employees” will
reanimate the sorts of antitrust problems that have been exorcised by labor law. 47
Antitrust violations are subject to federal injunction and carry hefty substantive
penalties. 48 The mere threat of antitrust liability has been shown by scholars to
deter concerted activity directed at pressuring companies to improve the working
conditions of their non-employee workers. 49

[https://perma.cc/JBR3-M8R2] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). This figure is questionable for a
number of reasons, not the least of which is that a large portion of the “Gig” economy is simply not
included. Alastair Fitzpayne & Shelly Steward, Nine Things to Know Before the 2017 Contingent
Worker Supplement is Released, ASPEN INST. (Jun. 6, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blogposts/nine-things-to-know-before-2017-cws-release/ [https://perma.cc/JE4G-2GCP]. The central
premise of the Gig economy is that workers are not employees, and it is the “not-employee”
character of the workers that carries the potential for invocation of antitrust law.
45. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471–72 (1921) (holding that even
peaceful labor disputes involving “secondary” labor pressure were not “proximately and
substantially concerned . . . in an actual dispute respecting the terms or conditions of their own
employment, past, present or prospective” so as to shelter employees from the operation of the
federal antitrust laws).
46.
Courts have recognized both ‘statutory’ and ‘non-statutory’ labor exemptions to the
antitrust laws . . . The statutory exemption . . . establishes that labor unions are not
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and exempts certain union activities from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws . . . However, the statutory exemption does ‘not exempt
concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties.’ The non-statutory
labor exemption . . . has been inferred from federal labor statutes. These ‘set forth a national
labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining,’ ‘require good-faith bargaining
over wages, hours, and working conditions’ and ‘delegate related rulemaking and
interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.’
Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
47. For a very early expression by the U.S. Supreme Court of the principle that independent
contractors are excluded from labor exemptions from antitrust law, see Columbia River Packers
Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942).
48. For the scope of liability, see Antitrust Guidance For Human Resource Professionals,
DEP’T JUST.: ANTITRUST DIV. AND FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/atr/file/903511/download [https://perma.cc/4UNH-Y88J]. As Professor Paul has observed, the
continued interplay of labor and antitrust law seems oddly anachronistic and may be ripe for broad
challenge. Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective
Action, 47 LOYOLA CHI. L. J. 969, 1030 (2016).
49. Id. at 982 (discussing chilling effect of specter of antitrust on organizing activities of
drivers in deregulated trucking industry alleged to be independent contractors).
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Third, workplace arbitration, which is now compulsory for over half the
private-sector employees in the United States, 50 may complicate non-union
employee work stoppages. Compulsory arbitration is frequently controversial.
The practice itself was at the heart of the 2018 Google work stoppage: workers
protested compulsory arbitration of sexual harassment and sexual assault
cases. 51 In the context of work stoppages, however, a more complicated problem
may arise in the wake of Epic System v. Lewis, 52 which has been understood as
broadly subordinating the NLRA to the Federal Arbitration Act. Although the
argument would previously have been unthinkable, it is now possible to
anticipate the claim that the right under the NLRA to engage in non-union
employee work stoppages is subordinate to an agreement by a non-union,
individual employee and an employer to waive the right in lieu of individual
employee arbitration. 53
II. NON-UNION EMPLOYEE WORK STOPPAGES AND INTERMITTENCY
This Part discusses non-union employee rights to engage in work stoppages
and explains how those rights can be adversely impacted. The non-union context
is important because the overwhelming number of employees in the United
States are not represented by unions; and it is not widely known that non-union
employees possess the right to engage in work stoppages under the NLRA, a
statute that is often erroneously believed to apply only to unionized workplaces
and employees. 54 The analysis of whether work stoppages are protected can
change depending upon their frequency. This can become a problem for nonunion employees who may have no idea that the timing of a work stoppage may,
in any respect, impact its protection under federal labor law.

50. “Among private-sector nonunion employees, 56.2 percent are subject to mandatory
employment arbitration procedures. Extrapolating to the overall workforce, this means that 60.1
million American workers no longer have access to the courts to protect their legal employment
rights and instead must go to arbitration.” Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory
Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (April 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-useof-mandatory-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/G6TE-PDG4].
51. The company apparently agreed to suspend the policy. See Bhuiyan, supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
52. 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
53. See infra Part IV.
54. Christine Walters & Patricia Wise, Viewpoint: The ABCs of the NLRA for Nonunion
Employers, SHRM (July 22, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/labor-rela
tions/pages/viewpoint-abcs-nlra.aspx [https://perma.cc/BW26-DVJZ].
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Non-Union Employee Work Stoppages Generally

As noted, non-union employees possess the right to engage in work
stoppages under American labor law. 55 Indeed, the right to engage in work
stoppages, and other “concerted activities” runs to employees and not directly to
“labor organizations,” or unions. 56 Unions’ rights are ultimately derivative of
employees’ rights. 57 Furthermore, the right of non-union employees to engage
in such work stoppages is tempered by the countervailing right of employers to
replace “strikers,” as opposed to discharging them, a counterweight that applies
equally in union and non-union workplaces. 58
Returning to the Google example, when thousands of non-union Google
workers walked off the job for one day on November 1, 2018, to protest
revelations “that Google had paid millions of dollars in exit packages to male
executives accused of misconduct, while staying silent about the
transgressions,” 59 the work stoppage was first a concerted activity within the
meaning of § 7 of the NLRA. 60 In addition, to enjoy coverage under the NLRA,
55. See Weinrib, supra note 31. The right to engage in a work stoppage either by unionrepresented or non-union employees is not absolute. The right can be curtailed where the objective
of a work stoppage is illegal, the work stoppage is carried out by tortious or criminal means, or the
work stoppage contravenes statutory labor policy or specific sections of the NLRA. See Robert F.
Koretz & Robert J. Rabin, The Development and History of Protected Concerted Activity, 24
SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 716-28 (1973).
56. National Labor Relations Act, Section 7 states in relevant part, “Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) (emphasis
added).
57. NLRB v. Jasper Seating Co., 857 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Nothing in the Act,
however, limits the rights of nonunionized employees to engage in concerted conduct for their
mutual aid regardless of whether or not their goal is supported by a majority of employees.”).
58. Replacement of strikers may be “permanent” or “temporary.” The distinction between the
two categories is that a temporarily replaced striker must be reinstated after making an
unconditional offer to return to work; an employer is not required to reinstate a striker who has
been permanently replaced until the replacement has left employment with the “struck” employer.
The same rules apply whether a work stoppage has arisen in a union or a non-union workplace. TriState Wholesale Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B 730, 733-34 (2015) (applying traditional strike
replacement rules in the context of a non-union work stoppage) enforced, 657 Fed.App’x. 421 (6th
Cir. 2016).
59. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Erin Griffith, Amie Tsang, & Kate Conger, Google Walkout:
Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of Sexual Harassment, N. Y. TIMES (November 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/HUG9-4PQ7].
60. For the relevant text, see § 7, supra note 56. To enjoy coverage under the National Labor
Relations Act conduct must be both protected and concerted. Prill v. NLRB. (“Prill II”), 835 F.2d
1481, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Fresh and Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B
151, 152, 154 (2014) (finding concerted a non-union employee’s attempt to enlist her coworkers’
assistance in raising a sexual harassment complaint to management, by soliciting three of them to
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concerted activity must be undertaken for the “mutual aid or protection” of
employees—in other words, to enjoy “protection,” the activity must have some
nexus to workers or working conditions. 61 In the non-union Google Walkout,
the protest had a clear nexus to working conditions because the alleged
transgressions were related to workplace misconduct that adversely impacted
workers. 62 Accordingly, had Google fired the workers for engaging in the work
stoppage, it might have been required to remit backpay for any lost wages
incurred thereby and ordered to reinstate the workers. 63 Google also might have
been lawfully entitled to “replace” employees engaging in a work stoppage, an
option that is usually of little value in a work stoppage of very short duration.
B.

Non-Union Work Stoppages in a Health and Safety Context

The law of work stoppages in health and safety contexts has become highly
relevant during the COVID-19 era. A number of factual situations have
emerged, but of particular interest to the public have been circumstances in
which nurses or other health care workers refused to work, claiming not to have
had adequate personal protective equipment. 64 Work stoppages have been
occurring, however, across the occupational landscape. 65 Some of the highest
COVID-19 infection and death rates in the economy have been in the
meatpacking industry; it has been extraordinarily dangerous work. 66 In fact,
meatpacking work has been so dangerous that the risk of contracting the
COVID-19 disease has been suggested as a cause of the significant absenteeism

sign the piece of paper on which she had copied the altered whiteboard message in order to “prove”
the harassment to which she had been subjected).
61. See Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 12, 17.
62. See Bhuiyan, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63. § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB., 338 F.3d 747, 748,
755 (7th Cir. 2003).
64. Justin Wise, Nurses Union Says Workers Were Suspended for Refusing to Help
Coronavirus Patients Without N95 Masks, HILL (Apr. 16, 2020) https://thehill.com/policy/health
care/493095-nurses-union-says-workers-were-suspended-for-refusing-to-help-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/5RL2-PQKD]; Madeleine Pauker, Santa Monica Nurses Refuse to Enter Patients’
Rooms Without N95 Masks, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.smdp
.com/santa-monica-nurses-refuse-to-enter-patients-rooms-without-n95-masks/189256 [https://per
ma.cc/X9U2-Y5DQ]; Janelle Griffith, Nurses are Protesting Working Conditions Under
Coronavirus—and Say Hospitals Aren’t Protecting Them, NBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/nurses-are-protesting-working-conditions-under-corona
virus-say-hospitals-aren-n1181321 [https://perma.cc/A9Z9-X293].
65. See COVID-19 Strike Wave Interactive Map, PAYDAY REPORT, https://paydayreport.com
/COVID-19-strike-wave-interactive-map/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
66. Eric Schlosser, America’s Slaughterhouses Aren’t Just Killing Animals, THE ATLANTIC
(May 12, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/essentials-meatpeacking-co
ronavirus/611437/ [https://perma.cc/6EFL-9DCA].
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suffered by the industry beginning in early-April 2020. 67 In an underreported
part of the absenteeism story, some non-union meatpacking employees simply
walked off the job in response to safety concerns. For example, in Kathleen,
Georgia, fifty employees walked off the job in a Perdue chicken facility in
protest of what they believed were unsafe working conditions. In the words of
Perdue employee Kendaliyn Granville:
We’re not getting nothing—no type of compensation, no nothing, not even no
[sic] cleanliness, no extra pay—no nothing. We’re up here risking our life [sic]
for chicken . . . All we’re asking now is just to sanitize the building. Sanitize the
building. Everybody that’s been exposed to it, they need to go home. These folks
are still on the floor. 68

Similar events have been unfolding at Amazon warehouses across the
United States. By the third week of April 2020, hundreds of non-union Amazon
workers “pledged to stay home from work, according to the worker rights group
United for Respect, as frustrations mount over protections and support for
Amazon employees.” 69 According to news reports, “[p]rotesting employees say
they will continue to call in sick until Amazon makes safety-related changes at
warehouses.” 70 Similar reports also disclosed plans for walkouts in New York, 71
Illinois, 72 and Michigan. 73 In early April, U.S. Senators were “intensifying
pressure for Amazon to improve working conditions for its warehouse
employees during the coronavirus pandemic” and questioning “the company’s
decision to fire an employee who demanded better health protections at the

67. Dan Charles, Meat Processing Plants Suspend Operations After Workers Fall Ill, NPR
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/07/828873225/
meat-processing-plants-suspend-operations-after-workers-fall-ill [https://perma.cc/M8XU-Q23C].
68. Sarah Hammond, ‘This is Not a Playing Matter’: Perdue Plant Employees Walk Out Over
COVID-19 Concerns, 13WMAZ (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/
perdue-employees-walk-out-as-coronavirus-concerns-grow/93-7c7bdcbb-f3ec-439b-b541-9070e
758b5cb [https://perma.cc/M6J6-A8GH].
69. Kari Paul, Hundreds of Amazon Warehouse Workers to Call in Sick in Coronavirus
Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/20/
amazon-warehouse-workers-sickout-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5AXV-KLWE].
70. Id.
71. Annie Palmer, Amazon Workers Plan Strike at Staten Island Warehouse to Demand
Coronavirus Protections, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/29/amazonworkers-in-staten-island-plan-strike-over-coronavirus-safety.html [https://perma.cc/ATH8-K923].
72. Caroline O’Donovan, As More Amazon Employees Contract the Coronavirus, Workers
Are Walking Off The Job, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolineodonovan/amazon-employees-coronavirus-walkout [https://perma.cc/6GSY-EUK
X].
73. Josh Dzieza, Exclusive: Detroit Amazon Workers Plan to Walk Out Over Handling of
COVID-19, THE VERGE (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/1/21202745/amazon-co
ronavirus-walk-out-detroit-protests-warehouse-cleaning.
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company’s facilities.” 74 In response to this activity, Amazon has reportedly
improved working conditions in a number of ways, but as of May 14, 2020, six
Amazon workers had apparently died of coronavirus complications, and
Amazon had still not released data on coronavirus infections. 75 In light of these
events, the continued potential for work stoppages like sickouts or mass
walkouts seems high.
At first blush, the law of work stoppages discussed in the preceding section
would appear to apply uniformly to health and safety connected work stoppages
because it is a form of concerted activity with a tight connection to working
conditions, 76 and this is substantially a correct assessment. In NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., for example, still the lead case in this area of law,
non-union employees engaged in a work stoppage over cold working
conditions. 77 The employer argued that the work stoppage was unprotected
because the employer had in good faith been attempting to improve working
conditions. 78 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that employees were
acting unreasonably because they had presented no demand to the employer:
We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right to engage in
concerted activities under s 7 merely because they do not present a specific
demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable. The
language of s 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take
place before, after, or at the same time such a demand is made. To compel the
Board to interpret and apply that language in the restricted fashion suggested by
the respondent here would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect
the right of workers to act together to better their working conditions. Indeed, as
indicated by this very case, such an interpretation of s 7 might place burdens
upon employees so great that it would effectively nullify the right to engage in
concerted activities which that section protects. The seven employees here were
part of a small group of employees who were wholly unorganized. They had no
bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to present
their grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak
for themselves as best they could. 79

Furthermore, and contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there is no
requirement under controlling labor law precedent that the health and safetyrelated concerted work-stoppages of employees must be “objectively
74. Shirin Ghaffary, Senators Are Demanding Answers from Amazon About How it Treats
Warehouse Workers, VOX (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/8/21214117/ama
zon-warehouse-workers-coronavirus-senator-booker-chris-smalls-senators-letter.
75. Annie Palmer, Sixth Confirmed Amazon Worker Dies Amid Calls for the Company to
Release Data on Coronavirus Infections, CNBC (May 14, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/
14/sixth-confirmed-amazon-worker-dies.html [https://perma.cc/84U2-NLL9].
76. See Wise, supra note 64.
77. 370 U.S. at 16.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Id.
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reasonable” to enjoy protection under the NLRA. Some confusion in this area
can arise because of the interplay of §§ 7 and 502 of the NLRA. § 502, a
provision of the law not under discussion in Washington Aluminum, states in
relevant part that “the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under
this Act.” 80 The purpose of § 502 is to make clear that workers engaging in a
work-stoppage because of abnormally dangerous working conditions will not be
deemed to have violated a no-strike pledge (and accompanying promise to
arbitrate disputes) in a collective bargaining agreement.81 Violation of such a
pledge may render a strike subject to injunction, and it is in this limited context
that employee concerted activity is scrutinized for its objective reasonableness.82
The § 7 inquiry has nothing to do with objective reasonableness and is focused
exclusively on whether an employee subjectively believed that a threat to health
and safety existed. 83
C. Intermittency and the Walmart Case
Suppose that instead of engaging in a single work stoppage, Google workers
had participated in a repetitive series of work stoppages over time. Or consider
COVID-19 reactive work stoppages such as the sickouts at Amazon 84—
stoppages in reaction to specific disease threats have been roiling the economy
throughout the pandemic. 85 Such work stoppages, by definition, do not consist
80. § 502 of the NLRA (as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947), 29
U.S.C. § 143 (2018).
81. Nicholas A. Ashford & Judith I. Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights
Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 52
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 802, 807 (1977).
82. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 380-81, 387-88 (1974)
(“[A] union seeking to justify a contractually prohibited work stoppage under § 502 must present
‘ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous
condition for work exists.’”). This is not to suggest that there are no unresolved issues in the
interpretation of § 502. For example, the NLRB and the Sixth Circuit seem to accept that the
objective reasonableness requirement does not involve a danger-in-fact standard but rather requires
that employees have a good faith belief supported by ascertainable, objective evidence. TNS, Inc.
v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 391, 393 (6th Cir. 2002). But as cases like NLRB v. Tamara Foods, Inc,
have noted, § 502 does not appear to apply at all outside of the collective bargaining context. 692
F.2d 1171, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982)
83. Tamara Foods, 258 N.L.R.B No. 180 (1981) (“The general rule is that the protections of
Section 7 do ‘not depend on the manner in which the employees choose to press the dispute, but
rather on the matter that they are protesting,’. . .Inquiry into the objective reasonableness of
employees’ concerted activity is neither necessary nor proper in determining whether that activity
is protected.”) (internal citations omitted) enforced in relevant part, 692 F.2d 1171, 1183 (8th Cir.
1982).
84. See Paul, supra note 69.
85. See id.
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of the kind of unitary, union-context event tending to be at the heart of traditional
labor law—for example, a bargaining unit strike following months of collective
bargaining negotiations that break down, 86 or a single response to adverse
working conditions. 87 The hypothetical Google or actual COVID-19 series of
job actions would be, or are, something closer to the kind of “intermittent,” or
repeated, short-duration work stoppages that have often been found by the
NLRB, and the courts, to be unprotected. 88 The legislative history of the NLRA
gives no indication that Congress ever considered the legality of such work
stoppages, however. 89 Furthermore, the line between merely repeated, but
protected, work stoppages and unprotected intermittent work stoppages is
sufficiently hazy—indeed, the NLRB initially held such work stoppages
lawful 90—that unrepresented employees might be hard-pressed to see it. The
United States Supreme Court once held, in a union-context case, that the
“recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work to win unstated ends
was neither forbidden by Federal statute nor was it legalized and approved
thereby.” 91 The NLRB has carried forward and refined this rule with the core
principle remaining that “hit and run” work stoppages deliberately calculated—
”planning” has repeatedly, but vaguely, been central to the analysis—to “harass
the company into a state of confusion” are unprotected. 92 Yet, as this author first
wrote in 2007 and continues to think, “[t]o date, it does not appear that the NLRB
has squarely addressed the legal status of intermittent work stoppages in a non86. See e.g., Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 154 F.3d 276, 277–78 (6th Cir. 1998)
(chronicling the long and bitter Detroit Newspapers strike that commenced after collective
bargaining negotiations broke down).
87. See e.g., Quietflex Mfg. Co., 344 N.L.R.B 1055, 1055 (2005) (discussing discharge of 83
employees for refusing to vacate its parking lot where those employees had engaged in a peaceful
hour work stoppage to protest their terms and conditions of employment).
88. Int’l Union, U. A. W., A. F. Of L., Local 232 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245,
264–65 (1949) overruled on other grounds; Lodge 76, Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140, 154 (1976).
89. See Michael H. LeRoy, Creating Order Out of Chaos and Other Partial and Intermittent
Strikes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 239 (2000).
90. Id.
91. Int’l Union, 336 U.S. at 264–65.
92. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B No. 301, 1547, 1548, 1550 (1954). A second but
lesser rationale appears to be that employees should not gain the “benefits” of striking without also
being subjected to its “risks.” The “should not” portion of this formulation is another example of
the NLRB’s penchant for employing terms like “indefensibility” or disloyalty when it wishes to
“morally” condemn conduct that it does not like but is not easily condemnable under the National
Labor Relations Act. See NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 495–96
(1960) (holding that “nonstandard” labor activity even if unprotected is not, as the NLRB had
found, unlawful under the NLRA); infra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Matthew W.
Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 563–
64 (2007) (criticizing as extra-statutory the notion that employee misconduct described as
“disloyal” may on that basis be denied protection under the NLRA).
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union workplace directed against specific workplace grievances.” 93 The NLRB
has consistently held over the years that “repeated” work stoppages are protected
when they are “spontaneous attempts to pursue work-related complaints or
grievances and/or [sic] . . . which are precipitated by, and in protest against,
separate acts of the employer.” 94 It has also concluded that “recurrent” work
stoppages are rendered unprotected when there is:
[t]he occurrence of more than two separate strikes . . . the strikes are not
responses to distinct employer actions or problems with working conditions, but
rather part of a strategy to use a series of strikes in support of a single goal
because this would be more crippling to the employer and/or would require less
sacrifice by employees than a single prolonged work stoppage during which
strikers could be replaced; . . . the union announces or otherwise states its intent
to pursue a plan or strategy of intermittent strikes, or there is clear factual
evidence of an orchestrated strategy to engage in intermittent strike activity, and
[] the strikes are of short duration and proximate in time. 95

It does not appear that the NLRB has ever found a work stoppage among
employees who are wholly unaffiliated with a union to be rendered unprotected
because intermittent. The proposition that such work stoppages could be
unprotected in non-union situations is in clear tension with § 7 cases in other
NLRA contexts affording non-union employees solicitude. 96
In light of this, it is noteworthy that the NLRB’s recent decision in Walmart
Stores, Inc. 97 arose in a non-union workplace and deprived discharged
employees of the protection of the NLRA for allegedly engaging in intermittent
93. Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of the Treatment
of Immigration Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93, 124
(2007).
94. N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. 31-CA-23538 (Apr. 27, 1999); Westpac Elec., 321
N.L.R.B 1322, 1360 (1996); Meilman Food Indus., 234 N.L.R.B No. 94, 698, 712 (1978);
Overboard Door Corp., 220 N.L.R.B 431, 431–32 (1975) enforcement denied, 540 F.2d 878, 885
(7thCir. 1978); Blades Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B 561, 566 (1963).
95. Nat’l Steel and Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B 499, 510 (1997); Case 31-CA-23538,
N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. 31-CA-23538 (Apr. 27, 1999) (emphasis added) citing
Chelsea Homes, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B 813, 831 (1990); Robertson Indus., 216 N.L.R.B 361, 362
(1975) enforced, 560 F.2d 396, 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1976); GF Bus. Equip., 215 N.L.R.B 872, 878–
79 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 201, 202, 206 (8th Cir. 1975); Pacific Tel., 107 N.L.R.B at 1550, see
infra notes 120, 124 and 141; John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B 394, 396 (1959); Polytech, Inc., 195
N.L.R.B 695, 695, 697; Embossing Printers, 268 N.L.R.B 710, 722–23 (1984). The Memorandum
may leave some readers with the impression that the NLRB and courts have rather deliberately
developed a factor test over time for assessing when strikes are “intermittent” and when they are
not. The factual variety and dates of cited administrative and court decisions, however, reveal the
haphazardness of this patchwork “doctrine.” The same can be said of the even more factor-laden
test laid out in another NLRB administrative document. N.L.R.B Advice Memorandum, WestFarm
Foods, No. 19-CA-29147, at 8–9 (Jul. 22, 2004).
96. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
97. 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 1 (2019).
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work stoppages. 98 Walmart purports to reaffirm prior holdings of the type
already discussed—that “a strategy to return to work from a strike only to strike
again for the same purpose is inconsistent with a genuine strike and has no
protection in the Act.” 99 The case involved a coordinated set of work stoppages
at various Walmart stores in May and June 2013. 100 The work stoppages were
together titled the “Ride for Respect” and “most of the strikers travelled by bus
to Bentonville, Arkansas, where they participated in actions and protests at and
around Walmart’s headquarters during Walmart’s annual shareholders
meeting.” 101 Ultimately, Walmart fired fifty-five employees for violating
attendance policies by engaging in the work stoppages, and defended against
ensuing NLRB charges over the discharges on the grounds that the work
stoppages were unprotected under the NLRA. 102 Close inspection of the case
reveals that on its facts, application of intermittent strike doctrine was improper:
very few employees engaged in work stoppages, the stoppages were announced
well in advance of transpiring—allowing Walmart ample time to lawfully
replace employees had it wished to do so—and less than a majority of the
discharged fifty-five employees engaged in more than one work stoppage.103
Furthermore, out of Walmart’s 1.3 million employees, roughly 280 employees
engaged in “Ride for Respect” work stoppages. 104 In these circumstances,
application of intermittent strike doctrine was not merely overbroad, it was
incoherent.
Of central concern to this discussion, however, is the majority’s failure to
emphasize, as a matter of law, the fired employees’ lack of formal union
representation. The assumption in the case seems to have been that the
employees’ affiliation with the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union
(“UFCW”) was sufficient as a matter of law to establish that they were
responsible for the union’s plan to “harass the company into a state of
confusion.” 105 That affiliation must be carefully examined, however. While the
UFCW was leading the “Making Change at Walmart” campaign, which
“challeng[ed] Walmart to help rebuild our economy and strengthen families,” it
was not the employees’ certified union. 106 The campaign consisted of “a
coalition of Walmart associates, union members, small business owners,
98. Id. at 13, 15.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 12.
101. Id.
102. Walmart, slip. op. at 13, 36.
103. Gen. Couns.’s Answering Brief to Respondent’s Exceptions to the Decision of the Admin.
Law Judge at 20, (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-096240 [https://perma.cc
/M7A6-LPU4].
104. Id.
105. Walmart, slip. op. at 18.
106. Id. at 15.
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religious leaders, community organizations, women’s advocacy groups, multiethnic coalitions, elected officials and ordinary citizens who believe that
changing Walmart is vital for the future of our country” and sought to educate
the public about this issue. 107
“The UFCW intended for the Making Change at Walmart campaign to be led by
Walmart associates who wanted to see change at Walmart, and supported by
community stakeholders who would join in calling on Walmart to be a ‘better
employer’ since what happens at Walmart sets the tone for what happens across
every aspect of private sector employment in the United States.” 108

The UFCW was affiliated with Organization United for Respect at Walmart
(“OUR Walmart”), an organization founded in Maryland by a group of Walmart
employees. 109 UFCW considered OUR Walmart one of its “subsidiaries and
lends it tactical, legal, and financial support.” 110 UFCW and OUR Walmart were
thus connected, though membership in OUR Walmart was:
limited to current and former Walmart associates who complete the necessary
membership paperwork and pay $5 each month for membership dues
(customarily by personal check, credit card, debit card or money order). The
UFCW takes the lead on collecting and processing monthly dues payments,
which go into OUR Walmart’s bank account. 111

With respect to the case’s factual chronology:
At an OUR Walmart leadership meeting held on August 22-23, 2012, OUR
Walmart decided to begin using associate strikes as an additional tactic in its
efforts to induce Walmart to change its policies . . . because its members did not
believe that other tactics . . . were sufficiently effective in addressing OUR
Walmart’s concerns about retaliation against OUR Walmart members. 112

OUR Walmart thereafter conducted work stoppages that were highly scripted—
even theatrical. 113 OUR Walmart carried out highly publicized work stoppages
107. Id. at 18.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Walmart, slip. op. at 18–19.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Walmart, slip. op. at 22:
To ensure that its members consistently adhered to the ULP strike strategy, OUR Walmart
provided potential strikers with: a form letter to sign and deliver to Walmart when they
went on strike; a script to read when they advised their store manager that they were going
on strike; a form letter to sign and deliver to Walmart when strikers were ready to return to
work; and a script to read when strikers advised their store manager that they were ready to
return to work. Each of those documents emphasized OUR Walmart’s ULP strike strategy
by stating that the associates went on strike “to protest Walmart’s attempts to silence
Associates who have spoken out against things like Walmart’s low take home pay,
unpredictable work schedules, unaffordable health benefits, and Walmart’s retaliation
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and other concerted activities. On October 4, 2012 (at a Walmart store in Pico
Rivera, California), October 9 and 10, 2012 (at various Walmart stores around
the country and at a Walmart headquarters meeting of financial analysts), and
“[t]hroughout November 2012 [when it] continued with its plan to hold
additional actions and strikes at various Walmart stores, including multiple
actions and strikes that occurred on Black Friday 2012, one of Walmart’s busiest
shopping days.” 114 At one point, Walmart filed an unfair labor practice charge
against OUR Walmart for alleged unlawful picketing. 115
Various similar OUR Walmart actions—strikes and “caravans” in the “Ride
for Respect”—continued throughout the spring and early summer in 2013. 116 At
one point, in February 2013, Walmart decided that it would not discipline
employees for strikes held in October or November 2012 but warned that it
“would apply its attendance policy to any future strikes.” 117 On about June 21,
2013, Walmart applied its discipline policy to employees engaging in work
stoppages thereby missing shifts during the late-May and early-June Ride for
Respect campaign. 118 Walmart eventually fired fifty-five employees for
violation of the company’s attendance policy; forty other employees received
lesser discipline. 119 Work stoppages and other concerted activities nevertheless
continued into the summer and fall of 2013, including “Black Friday,” the day
after Thanksgiving in November 2013. 120
Concern over this factually complex case has been expressed by commentators
lamenting the generally uncertain contours of intermittency doctrine, and the
NLRB’s unprecedented division of work stoppages into “genuine” and “nongenuine”;
I believe that the Board’s protection only for what it deems “genuine” strikes
raises serious equity issues for many low-wage, non-union workers, effectively
denying them the right to strike . . . Think about what it takes for workers to
engage in a “genuine” strike; that is, a strike in which all the workers walk off
the job and stay off until the underlying labor dispute is resolved, either by
against those who have spoken out.” . . . Similarly, OUR Walmart advised strikers that if
they made signs to carry during a demonstration while on strike, the associates should write
“Unfair Labor Practice Strike” on their sign, and select one of . . . six slogans . . .
114. Id. at 22–23.
115. This author has written about the uncertain liability of groups like OUR Walmart—that
organize and advocate on behalf of employees without either having been certified by the NLRA
or recognized as exclusive representatives by the involved employer—for unfair practice liability
under § 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) of the National Labor Relations act. See Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor,
Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 837,
842 (2014).
116. Walmart, slip. op. at 27–28.
117. Id. at 25.
118. Id. at 29.
119. Id. at 29, 30, 59.
120. Id. at 30.
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agreement or the union’s capitulation. Because employers have the right to
permanently replace economic strikers, a genuine strike is likely to go on for a
long time, unless workers are highly skilled and therefore difficult to replace. To
sustain a long strike, workers have to either be able to go without a paycheck for
a substantial period of time or have access to a well-resourced strike fund. That
makes a traditional strike a viable option primarily for well-paid workers or
workers who are represented by large unions with significant reserves. 121

Still, this vague bifurcation is not necessarily inconsistent with Board
doctrine denying protection to work stoppages planned to “harass the company
into a state of confusion.” 122 A “purely” harassing work stoppage under this
rubric could be considered “non-genuine.” 123 It might, of course, also be argued
that the “genuineness” of a motive for a work stoppage is a slender reed on which
to hang protection in any situation—all work stoppages, after all, are meant to
drive a company into some state of confusion. 124 Work stoppages are, by
definition, economic weapons. 125 Weapons do harm. That is the point of using
121. Sharon Block, Making Bad Law Worse: The Inequity of the Board’s Walmart Decision,
ON LABOR (Aug. 20, 2019), https://onlabor.org/making-bad-law-worse-the-inequity-of-the-boards
-walmart-decision/ [https://perma.cc/JZX4-WXWE].
122. Walmart, slip op. at 3.
123. There is no denying, however, that the NLRB has developed the tendency of classifying
effective employee economic weapons as “ungenuine.” See Toering Electric Co, 351 N.L.R.B. 225,
225, 240, 244 (2007) (ruling that in any refusal-to-hire case where an employer puts at issue the
applicant’s interest in actually working for the employer, the General Counsel of the NLRB must
produce evidence demonstrating the applicant for employment was genuinely interested in seeking
to establish an employment relationship with the employer, thereby creating an entirely new burden
for proving violations in such cases, and reversing the Board’s presumption that any individual who
submitted an application was entitled to the protection of the NLRA). The doctrinal development
was in response to union “salting” campaigns in which unions had been having success in
surreptitiously organized employees.
124. As the Supreme Court expressed this idea in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int’l Union, a
case in which it held that vexatious use by a union of nonstandard economic weapons could not
independently violate the NLRA:
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have
recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of the
statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of
economic weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individual workers and
productive enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other. But
the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations
policy, the two factors—necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the
availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the other party incline to agree
on one’s terms—exist side by side.
361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). In short, not even the NLRB can restrict these kinds of economic
weapons. See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (NLRB cannot
restrict employer lockouts).
125. The General Counsel cited in its Walmart trial papers for this proposition Allied
Mechanical Services, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1102 (2004) (“a requirement that a strike not be

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

LABOR VISCERALITY?

137

them. The manner in which any work stoppage harms an employer is to disrupt
normal operating procedures, thereby raising costs. Confusion is part and parcel
of the use of any economic weapon, as anyone who has ever been personally
involved in a labor dispute will attest. 126 The critical issue for intermittent strike
doctrine analysis, however, is planning—and, read in context, the cases are
concerned with whether work stoppages were planned to confuse employers and
to prevent them from permanently replacing employees engaged in a work
stoppage. In Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 127 for example, the
Communications Workers of America engaged in a pattern of “hit and run” work
stoppages triggering scrutiny under intermittent work stoppage doctrine.
The scheme was designed to compel the Respondent to “get its defenses up” —
or gather substitute workers wherever a stoppage was unexpectedly pulled—
“only to have the picket line gone” when the emergency crews reached the
picketed place. Thus, the traffic employees in a great many of the division’s
more than 200 offices walked off their jobs on different days instead of all at the
same time; at many offices they returned to work after a short time and then
walked out again after a day or two; and in some offices they again returned to
work briefly and later quit anew a third time. Meanwhile, CWA pickets ranged
over the entire division, appearing sporadically at a great number of offices. 128

The NLRB’s objection was that the design of the hit and run tactics was to
limit the ability of the employer to react quickly to changing tactics. It has
always seemed very unclear why that should matter. 129 As the NLRB has

disruptive of an employer’s operations, or harassing to it, is a requirement that the strike not be
conducted”), enforced Allied Mechanical Services, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 668 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Swope Ridge Geriatric Center, 350 N.L.R.B 64, 67 (2007) (“It is axiomatic that the very purpose
of a strike is to cause disruption, both operationally and economically, to an employer’s business
operations”). Interestingly, the Taft-Hartley Act’s 1947 amendment of the National Labor Relations
Act defined a strike as “any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a
stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted
slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (2018)
(emphases added).
126. The right, after all, has never been “absolute.” Employees may be disciplined for “‘slowdown,’ ‘sit-in,’ and arguably unprotected disloyal tactics.” See Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 494.
Any strike might be seen as disloyal or as a “slowdown,” and there is little controversy in present
times that strikes in which employees stop working but refuse to leave the employer’s premises are
trespassory. See NLRB. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 266–67 (1939).
127. 107 N.L.R.B 1547, 1548.
128. Id.
129. As already mentioned, the conduct could not of itself violate the NLRA. Insurance Agents,
361 U.S. at 494–95, and although the NLRB clearly has the authority to make case-by-case
determinations about the limits of protection afforded to “partial” strikes, id., it would certainly
also have the authority to draw careful lines in this area. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437 U.S. 556,
574–75 (1978) (“It may be that the ‘nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant
situations,’ requires ‘an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive
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elsewhere frankly acknowledged, “the principle of these cases is that employees
cannot properly seek to maintain the benefits of remaining in a paid employee
status while refusing, nonetheless, to perform all of the work they were hired to
do.” 130 The prohibition sounds vaguely equitable. But more than this, these rules
presume the existence of a sophisticated, organized planner, and it is hard to see
how an ad hoc group of non-union employees could presumptively be
considered as such. This is almost certainly why the NLRB has never found that
intermittency deprived non-union work stoppages of protection. This
background principle is in evidence in Roseville Dodge v. NLRB. 131 In that case,
the Eighth Circuit rebuffed an employer’s argument that non-union employees
engaged in an unprotected intermittent work stoppage, and additionally lost the
protection of the NLRA by remaining on the employer’s property during the
stoppage, thereby rendering their conduct trespassory. 132 In response to the
arguments, the court said, “[t]he evidence shows that this work stoppage was a
peaceful attempt by unsophisticated workers to notify the company—which did
not have a grievance procedure—of their dissatisfaction with working
conditions because other methods of communication had proven futile.” 133
D. Marquess of Queensberry Rules Applied to Non-Union Employees
However one might feel about these “equitable” Marquess of Queensberry
Rules, 134 especially in light of employers’ robust rights to permanently replace
and lock out employees engaging in (or even thinking about engaging in) a work
stoppage, 135 the prototypical intermittent work stoppage case involves a
union. 136 It has been tacitly assumed that only unions strategically plan work
stoppages around organizing campaigns or contract bargaining disputes. 137
Indeed, “intermittent strike doctrine” carries in it a hint of union misconduct,
though it is very clear that whatever else intermittent work stoppages may be
they are not unlawful. 138 Walmart is disquieting because it vaguely exports this
union misconduct theory—however unsupported by the text of the NLRA—to
formula as a comprehensive answer.’”) (quoting Local 761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
667, 674 (1961)).
130. Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B 695, 696 (1972).
131. 882 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1989).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1359.
134. A code of “fair” rules of boxing that influenced modern boxing. See MARQUESS OF
QUEENSBERRY RULES, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/sports
/Marquess-of-Queensberry-rules [https://perma.cc/8EFT-6NP5.].
135. See Moshe Marvit, Is It Time for the Courts to End Labor Lockouts?, THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION (Aug. 25, 2020), https://tcf.org/content/report/time-courts-end-labor-lockouts
/?agreed=1.
136. See Roseville Dodge, supra note 131.
137. Id.
138. Walmart, slip op. at 3.
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non-union employees, and maybe also to what, in context, was a civil society
organization. Although the group was coordinated by a union, it consisted of a
multiplicity of groups. A “coalition of Walmart associates, union members,
small business owners, religious leaders, community organizations, women’s
advocacy groups, multi-ethnic coalitions, elected officials and ordinary citizens
who believe that changing Walmart is vital for the future of our country.” 139 It
is as if employees who were not members of a union were being held responsible
for alleged violations of the NLRA by a union that was not their own. 140 Though
OUR Walmart and the UFCW were actors in the surrounding drama, 141 the
NLRB did not find OUR Walmart to be a labor organization, and the NLRB’s
General Counsel did not plead the discharge of the employees engaging in the
work stoppages as discrimination against union activity. 142 In short, there was
no union formally involved in the case. None of the cases cited by the NLRB as
instances in which intermittent work stoppages were found unprotected involved
non-union employees. 143 Thus, the distinction between unionized employees

139. Id. at 18.
140. The situation is distinguishable from those in which employees make common cause with
other unionized employees known to be engaging in an unlawful work stoppage. See Swift & Co.,
124 N.L.R.B. 394, 398 (1959). Here, there is no finding that the union violated the NLRA. Thus,
there is no unlawful conduct with which employees could have made common cause. And to be
sure, well-organized, alternative labor organizations affiliated with traditional unions—so called
“alt labor”—may themselves have some appreciation of when their activities may expose them to
liability. See generally Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor
Organization Bargain, 63 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2014). But it is extremely
questionable whether tactical work stoppage understandings by such groups could reasonably be
attributable to loosely-affiliated alt-labor group members. Of course, the argument applies with
even greater force where no labor organization of any kind is present.
141. Walmart, Sections II.B and II.C of ALJ’s decision. Slip op. at 27, 45.
142. Under section 2(5) of the NLRA, labor organization is defined as “any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (2018). OUR Walmart may satisfy the definition, but conflict with a “union” or
application of intermittent strike doctrine in a unionized context.
143. Farley Candy Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 849, 850 (1990) (union context); Honolulu Rapid Transit
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806, 1807–1811 (1954) (unprotected where union admittedly designed scheme
to strike only on weekends); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1548–1550
(unprotected where “[CWA’s—a union’s] announced strategy consisted of a multiplicity of little
‘hit and run’ work stoppages deliberately calculated, in CWA’s own words, to ‘harass the company
into a state of confusion’”). The NLRB might have cited Yale University, 330 N.L.R.B. 246, 253–
54 (1999) (finding unprotected a graduate students’ grade strike withholding papers and test
materials). Although the strike in that case was distinguishable as a “partial” strike, it is true that
the graduate students involved were not represented by a union. The case is factually
distinguishable, however, in that the students were members of the Graduate Employees and
Students Organization, had been seeking formal recognition as a union with Yale for three years,
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and non-union workers was ignored in the decision, as was the nature of the
“Making Change at Walmart” campaign as multi-organizational.
The obliteration of the line between union-represented and non-union
employees in the context of intermittency analysis is a mistake. A presumption
of protection should be made explicit in non-union work stoppage contexts. It is
possible to persuasively argue for this position from the NLRB’s reaffirmation
in Walmart that “work stoppages responding to distinct employer actions or
issues, even if close in time, are simply not pursuant to a plan to strike
intermittently for the same goal and are therefore protected.” 144 A plan to “strike
and strike again,” in response to “distinct employer actions or issues,” 145 is
essentially a restatement of the right to engage in a work stoppage. After all,
there is nothing legally problematic about a labor organization planning what it
has a right to do. One is reminded of Oliver Wendall Holmes’s famous labor law
observation that one may lawfully “threaten” what one has a right to do. 146 As
the NLRB long ago stated in Polytech, Inc., 147 a case in which non-union
employees were alleged to have engaged in an unprotected intermittent work
stoppage,
This analysis . . . demonstrated the existence of a presumption that a single
concerted refusal to work overtime is a protected strike activity; and that such
presumption should be deemed rebutted when and only when the evidence
demonstrates that the stoppage is part of a plan or pattern of intermittent action
which is inconsistent with a genuine strike or genuine performance by
employees of the work normally expected of them by the employer. 148

The strengthened presumption of protection embodied in Polytech should be
explicitly extended. Where employees are not represented by a union, it should
be understood that they must speak for themselves as best they can. 149 The
and was intertwined with the question of whether the graduate students were statutory employees.
Id.
144. Walmart Stores Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 2 (2019).
145. See N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem., supra note 94, slip op. at 3–4 (Apr. 27, 1999).
146. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896)
(“I pause here to remark that the word ‘threats’ often is used as if, when it appeared that
threats had been made, it appeared that unlawful conduct had begun. But it depends on what
you threaten. As a general rule, even if subject to some exceptions, what you may do in a
certain event you may threaten to do, that is, give warning of your intention to do in that
event, and thus allow the other person the chance of avoiding the consequences. So as to
“compulsion,” it depends on how you ‘compel.’”).
So too, one may argue, may you “plan.”
147. 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972).
148. Id. at 696–697. Possibly no greater example of the “reaction” versus “plan” idea could be
conceived than the non-union work stoppages that spread during the COVID-19 pandemic which
seem to come close to utterly unplanned, reflexive acts of survival. See supra. at Part II.B.
149. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 31, at 14. Of course, none of this is to suggest that
employers did not already possess the burden of showing that a lawful strike had for some reason
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NLRB has probably implicitly been following this policy all along, since there
are few (if any) reported cases in which employees wholly unconnected with a
union were found to have engaged in unprotected intermittent work
stoppages. 150 In Walmart, a presumption of protection may have been rebuttable
given the nature of the “Making Change at Walmart” campaign and the union
affiliation—even if informal—of the fired employees. But the NLRB and the
courts have previously applied absence of union representation (or a formal
grievance procedure) as a mitigating factor in determining whether employees’
work stoppages are unprotected, 151 and it should strengthen and make more
explicit that principle. 152 It is deeply disturbing that the NLRB utilized a case
like Walmart—in which intermittent strike doctrine was inapplicable on the
facts—to increase the risk of clumsy application of the doctrine to the new, nonunion economy.
III. SOME WORK STOPPAGE IMPLICATIONS OF A “NO ONE’S AN EMPLOYEE”
ECONOMY
To this point, the discussion has centered on problems applicable to
“employees” who are clearly covered under the NLRA, with the major analytical
division in Part II focusing on distinctions between “union” and “non-union”
employees. The next of the major complexities the article will consider,
however—the issue of who is an employee under the NLRA, or for that matter
under any labor or employment law—in some respects stands the previous
discussion on its head. 153 Here, the discussion centers on problems potentially

lost its protection. Silver State Disposal Serv., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 84, 85 (1998) (holding that an
employer bears the burden of showing that work stoppage is unprotected) (citing Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, 277 (1956) (acknowledging that whether a work stoppage is
unprotected because it violates a no-strike clause is an affirmative defense)). The point here is that
the burden should be heavier in circumstances where employees are wholly unaffiliated with a
union.
150. This author has been unable to locate any such cases and the General Counsel made the
same observation in his briefing of Walmart. Gen. Couns.’s Answering Brief to Respondent’s
Exceptions to Decision of Admin. Law Judge at 13, 21; Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24
(2019) (No. 16-CA-096240).
151. Quietflex Mfg., 344 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1057 (2005) (“whether employees were represented
or had an established grievance procedure”); First Nat’l Bank of Omaha v. N.L.R.B., 413 F.2d 921,
926 (1969) (upholding NLRB protection of a concerted employee work stoppage because “[h]ere,
the employees were unorganized and were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement”).
152. Scholar George Schatzki once made an even more expansive argument: employees should
not pay with their jobs when engaging in concerted activity they did not know to be wrongful.
George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—“Protected”
Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 402 (1969).
153. For extended description of the fragmentation of the employment relationship see DAVID
WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN
BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 17, 21 (2014).
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surfacing if workers engaging in concerted activity that would likely otherwise
be protected under the NLRA are not statutory employees.
A.

No Protection

It is elementary that if a worker engages in lawful concerted activity but is
found not to be an employee within the meaning of the NLRA, she does not
enjoy the protection of the NLRA. 154 It may seem odd to think of non-employees
such as independent contractors engaging in work stoppages. The narrative of
the Gig economy—a heavy utilizer of independent contractors, after all—is that
such workers are free agents who are at complete liberty to come and go as they
please. This narrative seems to render the idea of a work stoppage incoherent,
since an “independent” worker could simply leave. 155 One might also assume
that a non-employee would know she did not possess the right to engage in a
work stoppage. But these assumptions may not comport with economic
reality. 156 Gig work and alternative work arrangements are extremely
heterogeneous. 157 Aside from the lawyerly problem of determining a worker’s
actual employment status (often after an adverse action of some type has already
been taken against a putative employee by a putative employer), is the problem
of how a worker could be expected to accurately predict that status in advance
of engaging in workplace-related concerted activities. In California, for
example, a worker designated an independent contractor by the company for
154. NLRA, Section 7 states only “employees” have “the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .” Moreover, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7”
(emphasis supplied). NLRA Section 13 states, “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” From the confluence of
these two sections, the right of employees to strike has never been questioned but has been
qualified. See NAT’L LAB. RELS. BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, https://www.nlrb.gov
/strikes [https://perma.cc/Z7D4-B749] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
155. See Guidance Letter from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (Apr. 29,
2019),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/2019_04_29_06_FLSA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43Y5-D7PR] (discussing whether “service providers” are employees and
answering in the negative based in part on fact that they “appear to maintain a high degree of
freedom to exit the working relationship”) (on file with U.S. Department of Labor).
156. The United Nations, for example, recognizes that the identity of “employers” and
“employees” is a challenge to attempting to apply law to the Gig economy. Hannah Johnston &
Chris Land-Kazlauskas, Organizing On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective
Bargaining in the Gig Economy, INT’L LABOUR OFF. 1, 5 (2019).
157. See GIG ECON. DATA HUB, CORNELL U. ILR SCHOOL https://www.gigeconomydata.org/
(exploring the great variety of “Gig” work arrangements and explaining in part that traditional
definitions of “employee” and “independent contractor” are problematic), [https://perma.cc/D4CVB69S] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
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whom she works may in fact be an employee as a matter of state law. 158 The
California definition, however, would not be controlling under the NLRA under
a recent shift in employee definition by the NLRB which sharply departs from
both the California and traditional common law employee definitions. 159
Perhaps even worse, different employee definitions under various state
employment laws may apply in the worker’s state. 160 Thus, even if a worker
knows generally about the right of “employees” to engage in work stoppages,
she may also realize that she—as a possible non-employee—engages in such
conduct at her peril. In an economy in which millions of precarious workers are
unilaterally designated independent contractors, 161 or as other forms of “nonemployee” Gig workers, 162 the narrowed employee definition endangers
workers’ rights to engage in work stoppages in at least two ways. First, a worker
may erroneously believe she is an employee, when in fact she is an independent
158. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018)
(applying ABC employment test to a large swath of California economy in opinion expressing
broad concern with widespread workers misclassification). With respect to the ABC test:
Some courts using this test look at whether a worker meets three separate criteria to be
considered an independent contractor: 1) The worker is free from the employer’s control or
direction in performing the work; 2) The work takes place outside the usual course of the
business of the company and off the site of the business; 3) Customarily, the worker is
engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business.
LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/abc_test
[https://perma.cc/C53N-GZK3] (last visited (Aug. 20, 2020).
Dynamex and its ABC standard has now been codified under California law. Cal. Lab. Code §
2750.3 (2019). There is continuing confusion over who is or is not an employee under California
law and employee standards differ within the state for purposes of workers’ compensation law.
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (establishing use
of common law, multifactor test in workers’ compensation cases).
159. SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019) (placing unusual emphasis on
workers’ “entrepreneurial opportunity” in contradistinction to the common law’s traditional
emphasis on control over working conditions). Whatever this new standard may come to mean, it
is far different than California’s ABC test, and seems much more likely to produce findings of
independent contractor status.
160. See, e.g., Carmago’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Mass. 2018) (upholding different
employee definitions under Massachusetts workers’ compensation and independent contractor
statutes).
161. The number of independent contractors in the U.S. is frequently disputed. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) found the figure to be 6.9% of the work force as of 2017. Tracking the
Changing Nature of Work: the Process Continues, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://blogs.bls.gov/blog/tag/independent-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/4E8R-72BS]. On the
other hand, the BLS also admits that it has no working definition for a gig worker. Id. Apparently
the imprecision holds true in a number of quarters. For example, Edison Research Company polls
have estimated that 24% of workers over the age of 18 are participating in the gig economy. Gig
Economy, Marketplace-Edison Research Poll, EDISON RSCH. (Dec. 2018), http://www.edisonre
search.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Gig-Economy-2018-Marketplace-Edison-Research-PollFINAL.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9RRZ-SQBB].
162. See Schatzki, supra note 152, at 402.
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contractor. This misapprehension may lead to legal consequences that will be
discussed in the next two subsections if the worker does engage in a work
stoppage. Second, confusion over employee status could severely chill
employees’ rights to engage in work stoppages. Workers may be unwilling to
engage in the protected activity if there is any significant doubt about their
employee status. Such statute-disrupting outcomes, if desired, should be
implemented by Congress and not left to happenstance.
B.

The Labor Injunction

A more subtle problem than non-protection exists if workers are broadly
deemed not to be employees under the NLRA (or perhaps under any statute).
Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLA”), 163 federal courts have been carefully
restricted from issuing injunctions in peaceful “labor disputes” unless an
injunction is specifically authorized under the NLRA. 164 A “labor dispute” is
defined under the NLA as, “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.” 165 As will be discussed,
some courts, focused on the statutory employment predicate of an NLA “labor
dispute,” have held that disputes between employers and independent
contractors are not “labor disputes” within the meaning of the NLA. 166
It follows that, where courts determine workers are independent contractors,
those same courts may conclude that they are authorized to enjoin peaceful
protest activity by independent contractors, supplementing courts’ explicit
authorization to issue labor injunctions under the NLRA. 167 Thus, in the Google
163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2018).
164.
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall
any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the
public policy declared in this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2018) (emphasis added).
166. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1942) (dispute between
fish buyers and fish sellers not labor dispute within meaning of NLA, so district court injunction of
alleged underlying antitrust conduct upheld); Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l. U. of Journeymen
Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593, 601 (4th Cir. 1965) (farriers not employees and accordingly no labor
dispute existed within meaning of the NLA).
167. Under the NLRA, federal courts may issue preliminary injunctions against parties where
there is reason to believe the NLRA has been violated and where it is “just and proper” to do so.
Federal courts may also issue injunctions against labor organizations for a variety of violations
including, but not limited to, engaging in unlawful secondary activity, engaging in unlawful
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example in which workers were protesting alleged “buyouts” of managers
accused of sexual harassment, it is noteworthy that more than half of Google’s
220,000-person workforce are independent contractors. 168 Given what has just
been said about the non-applicability of the NLA to independent contractors, a
federal district court, not faced with an NLA “labor dispute,” might have had
jurisdiction to enjoin the Google protest despite its peaceful character. A federal
court must, of course, have some underlying jurisdiction over a dispute in order
to have injunctive power in connection with it, but courts in the past seemed able
to fashion a variety of jurisdictional theories, which was one of the major reasons
Congress enacted the NLA to protect employees’ right to engage in peaceful
labor activity. 169
It may not be immediately apparent why the ability of a federal court to issue
an injunction in a peaceful “labor” dispute matters. In The Labor Injunction, a
volume co-written by then-Harvard law professor and later Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, 170 the authors argued that a labor

picketing, and striking in violation of a contractual no-strike pledge. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), (j),
(l) (2018).
168. Todd Haselton, Senators Demand Google Make Contractors Full-Time Employees,
CNBC (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/senators-demand-google-make-contrac
tors-full-time-employees.html [https://perma.cc/WC8Z-YFBY]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s
Shadow Work Force: Temps Who Outnumber Full-Time Employees, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-temp-workers.html [https://perma.cc/P
5KV-VWZR].
169. Michael C. Duff, Labor Injunctions in Bankruptcy: The Norris-LaGuardia Firewall, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 669, 677–81 (2009).
170. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);
see also Thomas R. Haggard, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Strikes: Resolving the
Apparent Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and the Anti-Injunction Provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706 (1985). One commentator has alleged that the
personal biases of Frankfurter and Greene influenced those authors’ conclusions. See generally
Sylvester Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932. Part 1. What the Courts Actually Did
- and Why, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1978). Even if this were true, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
was nevertheless a primary influence on Congress and is therefore an indispensable resource for
divining congressional intent in enacting the NLGA. For evidence that the Congress believed the
conclusions of Frankfurter and Greene, and a good deal more, consider the statement of Rep.
McGugin made on the House floor on March 8, 1932:
Some day and some time, when the history of this country is written, some historian will
obtain a copy of one of these tyrannical labor injunction decrees and will point out how far
the courts went in excess of their rights and contrary to human liberty and righteousness.
Injunctions enjoining a man from talking to his neighbor about anything which he may want
to discuss, whether it be a strike or a labor dispute, or what not, is contrary to the true
principles of liberty. If there were not a single laboring man in the United States asking for
this bill, we should curb the power of the courts in granting these injunctions, upon the
broad principle that such injunctions are a menace to liberty. [Applause.]
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injunction issued by a court against a union during the early stages of a work
stoppage will tend to permanently defeat employees engaged in a labor
dispute. 171 The labor injunction has always been provocative. 172 Throughout the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal judiciary created legal
doctrines to justify issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, grounded in various
substantive areas, including breach of contract 173 and interference with railroad
receiverships. 174 Although this labor injunction history emerged in the context
of union activity, there is no reason to suppose that an injunction issued against
non-union worker protest would not equally tend to suspend and chill work
stoppages, effectively cloaking the merits of a workplace dispute in a manner
benefiting the target of the protest. 175
How does an independent contractor protest “working conditions” free from
the threat of federal injunction, if one is not an employee? A response to this
non-union worker injunction conundrum was suggested in an older opinion of
the Supreme Court in Columbia River Packers’ Association v. Hinton. 176 In that
case, a packers’ association possessed plants for processing and canning fish in
the Pacific Northwest. 177 It procured its fish primarily from independent
fishermen, who, while members of the Pacific Coast Fishermen’s Union, were
found to be independent “entrepreneurs,” and not employees of the packers’
association. 178 The union acted as a “collective bargaining agency” in the sale
of fish caught by its members, and the union’s internal rules forbade its members
from providing fish to producers like the packers’ association “outside of Union
75 CONG. REC. 5500 (1932). For a general critique of Petro’s methods see William E. Forbath, The
Shaping of the Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1250–51 n.601 (1989) [hereinafter
Shaping of the Labor Movement].
171. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 170, at 201.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 39–40. Indeed, the entirety of Section 3 of the NLGA is devoted to rendering
unenforceable in federal courts the “yellow dog” contract, an agreement between an employer and
employee that the employee would refrain from joining or remaining a member of a union. A
union’s alleged interference with such a contract was one method by which employers had
successfully “federalized” labor disputes, making them susceptible to federal injunction. See, e.g.,
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915).
174. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 170, at 23.
175. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 716
(1982)
(“The legislative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to
use federal judges as ‘strike-breaking’ agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled
‘equitable discretion,’ federal judges could enter injunctions based on their disapproval of
the employees’ objectives, or on the theory that these objectives or actions, although lawful
if pursued by a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through the ‘conspiracy’
of concerted activity”).
176. 315 U.S. 143, 143 (1942).
177. Id. at 144.
178. Id. at 145.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

LABOR VISCERALITY?

147

agreements.” 179 The union’s standard contracts of sale also required buyers like
the packers’ association not to purchase fish from nonmembers of the union. 180
The packers’ association refused these terms, and the union in turn induced its
members to refrain from selling fish to the association. 181 Because the union’s
control of the fish supply was extensive, the association was unable to obtain the
fish it needed to carry on its business. 182 The packers’ association filed suit
alleging that the union’s actions violated federal antitrust law.183 A federal
district court agreed with the association’s position, found a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, and issued an injunction requiring the union to cease and
desist in its actions. 184 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that issuance of the
injunction violated the NLA: “[t]he injunction . . . was granted without
jurisdiction to do so, and the portion of the decree granting an injunction must
be stricken.” 185 In other words, the Ninth Circuit found that the NLA applied to
the dispute; but, in reversing that decision, the Supreme Court stated,
[t]he controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The
sellers are not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they
seek to be. On the contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent
businessmen, free from such controls as an employer might exercise. 186

The issuance of the injunction did not therefore violate the NLA because the
fish sellers were not employees, a condition precedent to establishment of a labor
dispute under the NLA. Certain important implications flow from the foregoing
passage. Had the underlying dispute been one in which the putative independent
contractors sought to be employees, or had the independent contractors
contended that they were in fact employees, the dispute might have fallen within
the NLA’s definition of labor dispute. 187 Strictly read, the passage also suggests
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. at 145.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 144–45.
185. Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass’n, 117 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1941).
186. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. at 147.
187. As will be explained in the next Part, whether workers’ actions are regulated by antitrust
law is closely related to whether worker conduct is subject to injunction notwithstanding the
contours of the NLA. Employee status thus bears on whether concerted action is exempted from
the Sherman Antitrust Act and also whether the same concerted activity is an NLA-cognizable
“labor dispute.” Professor Paul has argued that a minor exception to antitrust law’s regulation of
non-employee concerted action applies to “independent contractor workers who are organizing
specifically toward employee status, not those who are engaging in concerted action to directly
better their conditions, or for other purposes” and that “organizing specifically for improved wages
and working conditions ought to be within the scope of this exception, so long as employee status
is also among the aims (under the test that the dispute must relate to terms and conditions of
employment).” Paul, supra note 48, at 1033, n.240.
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that had the independent contractors been the employees of “any other
employer” the dispute might have been brought within the NLA. Columbia River
Packers provides clues to the kinds of arguments that putative non-employee
workers might make in an attempt to insulate themselves from federal
injunctions. Chief among these arguments may be that non-employee workers
should always explicitly contest their non-employee status while they are
protesting the merits of the underlying workplace dispute. This might position
them to argue the proposition such as that “[t]he term ‘labor dispute’ must not
be narrowly construed,” and that “the employer-employee relationship [is] the
matrix of the controversy,” a broad reading of the term followed by the Supreme
Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen’s
Association. 188
Other cases seem to narrow the labor dispute definition, in tension with
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals’ broad reading of Columbia River Packers. In
Taylor v. Local No. 7, International Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 189 for
example, the Fourth Circuit reversed a federal district court’s finding that certain
horseshoers—also known as farriers—were employees. 190 Somewhat unusually,
the circuit court itself analyzed the job functions of the workers that were at
issue. 191 Having concluded that the farriers and horse trainers and owners did
not stand in the relation of employer and employee, the court next considered
the defendant-workers’ alternative argument that, even if the workers were
independent contractors, they were nevertheless engaged in a “labor dispute” as
defined under the NLA. 192
The only interests sought to be advanced by the activities of these defendants
are the interests of those independent horseshoers who render services to trainers
and owners for a certain fee, unilaterally fixed, per horse. They are independent
businessmen, specialists in their line, who have banded together and who act in
concert for their mutual benefit and improvement. We fail to discover the
existence of any employer-employee relationship which is the ‘matrix’ of this
controversy or any condition which, under the provisions of either the Clayton
Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would protect the activities of the
defendants. 193

Despite the paucity of authority since Columbia River Packers touching on
the question of application of the NLA to non-employee workers, the broad
definition of labor dispute counseled by Jacksonville Bulk Terminals has been

188.
at 147).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

457 U.S. 702, 712–13 (1982) (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S.
353 F.2d 593, 593 (4th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 601, 606.
Id. at 599–600.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 606.
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broadly embraced by the federal courts. 194 It is difficult to locate any narrowing
authority. Although it would be unwise for independent contractors, Gig
workers, or other actual or putative non-employees to enter into a dispute with
their “employing” entity without appreciating the potential for federal court
injunctions, it also seems clear that the NLA is likely to be interpreted broadly,
diminishing, at least, the risk of that outcome.
1.

Work Stoppages and Antitrust

When independent contractors or other non-employee workers engage in
work stoppages, they run the risk of violating antitrust law. 195 The Sherman
Antitrust Act states that, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 196 Although this
language is on the surface broad enough to encompass traditional labor activity,
federal law has historically—though not without repeated struggles 197—
exempted such activity from the Sherman Act. 198 Those exemptions, however,
do not apply to non-employee workers when deemed independent businesses. 199
Despite legislative history that antitrust law was never meant to apply to
combinations of workers, 200 the number of non-employee workers has been
expanding through operation of the Gig economy, thus bringing these new
“combinations” to the edge of the black hole that is antitrust. 201 When non194. The Court has observed that “the statutory definition itself is extremely broad,” Brady v.
N.F.L., 644 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., 457 U.S. at
712). “Congress made the definition broad because it wanted it to be broad.” Brady, 644 F.3d at
671 (quoting Order of R.R. Teleg. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 362 U.S. 330, 335–36 (1960). The
courts have also demonstrated the continued broad reach of the NLA by rebuffing efforts by
railroad employers to escape the NLA by obtaining injunctions to suppress secondary labor activity
by railroad unions. (Unlike the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act provides courts with no secondary
boycott injunctive authority). Burlington N. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp., 481 U.S. 429,
451, 453 (1987); Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp.,
795 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986).
195. Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two
Gilded Ages, 78 MD. L. REV. 766, 793 (2019) (arguing that since the 1970s, federal courts “have
renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only appropriate objective
is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer welfare”).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019).
197. Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 58 (2019).
198. See Cal. ex rel. Harris, supra note 46.
199. Paul, supra note 48, at1030.
200. Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 779–783.
201. Id. at 809–810 (“Given employers’ increasing classification—and misclassification—of
workers as independent contractors across the economy, the Clayton Act’s exemption for labor, as
currently interpreted, provides many workers with no protection from antitrust investigations and
lawsuits.”)
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employee workers—if considered independent businesses—agitate concertedly
for improvements in working conditions, they may become subject to antitrust
sanctions, which is a serious matter because under antitrust law,
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if
a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court. 202

It will be recalled that a number of the older cases discussing NLA injunctive
authority arose in antitrust contexts in which it was alleged that antitrust
violations should be enjoined. 203 A close connection therefore exists with
respect to the employment relation for purposes both of establishing NLA
jurisdiction and opening the door to substantive and injunctive relief under
antitrust law. In short, work stoppages by non-employee workers may be
unprotected by the NLA and sanctionable under antitrust law. 204
Even statutory employees may be derivatively subject to antitrust risk. In
recent years, some employees have acted under the aegis of worker centers and
other “alt-labor” groups. 205 There is a serious question as to whether these
groups fall under antitrust law’s safe harbor for labor activity. 206 One case has
(frighteningly) held that under antitrust law, the existence of a labor organization

202. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019).
203. See e.g. 180 Colum. River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 25, provides for antitrust injunctions sought by the Government. The section
gives U.S. District Courts jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of the antitrust laws and
directs U.S. Attorneys, under the supervision of the Attorney General, to file actions seeking to
prevent and restrain the violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 authorizes “any person, firm, corporation, or
association” to seek injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws. Private parties may also seek injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 26. See Merit Motors, Inc.
v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
205. See Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), https://prospect.
org/notebook/alt-labor.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 17 states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained
in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and
not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
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is a fact question for a jury. 207 Though this seems somewhat doubtful given the
law of the NLRA, 208 Jeffrey Hirsch and Joseph Seiner have cautioned,
Among the potential disadvantages of nontraditional groups—and the most
significant from a financial and criminal perspective—is antitrust law. Perhaps
no issue better represents the knife’s edge facing nontraditional groups, which
must carefully monitor whether their actions may constitute anticompetitive
behavior under antitrust law and, if so, whether they will enjoy protection under
the antitrust labor exception. This task is made all the more difficult by the
opacity of antitrust law as it applies to nontraditional labor efforts. 209

If alt-labor groups are not “labor organizations” within the meaning of the
NLRA, their participation in various worker concerted activities may be deemed
a “conspiracy in restraint of trade” in violation of antitrust law, with employeemembers vulnerable as “co-conspirators.” 210
Ultimately, as Marshall Steinbaum has put it, if the only objective of
antitrust law is lower prices for consumers, then “collective action by port
truckers, home health aides, church organists, or gig economy workers is
inefficient rent-seeking.” 211 While a full discussion of the interplay between
antitrust and labor law is beyond the scope of this article, the narrow question
here is whether all non-employee work stoppages must boil down to unlawful
“rent seeking” under the Sherman Act. Returning to the protesting, independent
contractor-heavy Google workers, for example, the concerted activity in
question was a complicated affair. First, the group may have consisted of both
employee and non-employee workers because Google is a “mixed” work
force. 212 If the Google workers had consisted exclusively of non-employee
independent contractors, however, the question would be whether a work

207. Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Frightening because a non-employee
worker could be liable under antitrust through affiliation with a non-labor group the worker could
not have known in advance was not protected by the antitrust labor exemption.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) defines “labor organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” (Emphases supplied).
209. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1776 (2018).
210. Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634–38 (1981) (discussing
difficult problems of liability allocation given potentially very large classes of co-conspirators).
211. Id. at 59; see also Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 793 (arguing that since the 1970s federal
courts “have renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only
appropriate objective is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer welfare”). Obviously,
had this historically been the only policy cognizable under antitrust law, the general labor law
exemption could never have come into existence.
212. Mark Bergen and Ellen Huet, The Secret and Frustrating Life of a Google Contract
Worker, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story
/2019-11-08/the-secret-and-frustrating-life-of-a-google-contract-worker.
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stoppage over sexual harassment could implicate antitrust law. One should
distinguish here between non-employee work stoppages aimed at “protest” and
those aimed at affecting remuneration in a way that might lead to diminished
consumer welfare in the form of higher prices—admittedly a narrow view of
that welfare. 213 Increased remuneration to independent contractors seems
rationally connected to increased consumer prices.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association, 214 a group of lawyers agreed not to represent indigent criminal
defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court until the District of
Columbia government (which was not their employer) increased the lawyers’
compensation. 215 The ensuing boycott 216 was completely successful. 217 The
Court stated that “[t]he agreement among the lawyers was designed to obtain
higher prices for their services and was implemented by a concerted refusal to
serve an important customer in the market for legal services and, indeed, the
only customer in the market for the particular services that [the lawyers]
offered.” 218 The Court characterized the lawyers’ conduct as “the essence of
price-fixing,” and concluded that “[t]he horizontal arrangement among these

213. This point does not seek to lend credence to the questionable primacy afforded “consumer
welfare” to the exclusion of all other social goods. The executive branch and judiciary “have
replaced congressional (and once-judicially validated) economic and political objectives with an
‘efficiency’ or ‘consumer welfare’ goal.” See Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 769. The point here is
that, even taking the consumer welfare arguments at face value, there must still be some articulable
linkage between collective activity and consumer harm.
214. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
215. Id. at 414.
216. The dictionary definition of boycott is “the process or an instance of joining with others
in refusing to deal with someone (as a person, organization, or country) as a way of protesting or
forcing changes.” MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/.
Specialized definitions of the term under federal labor law are beyond the scope of this discussion.
217. See Sup. Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 418. Within two weeks the involved lawyers’
rates were increased from $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time to a
temporary $35 per hour rate to a subsequent permanent increase to $45 an hour for out-of-court
time and $55 for in-court time. Id. at 416–418.
218. Id. at 422–23 (internal citations omitted).
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competitors was unquestionably a ‘naked restraint’ 219 on price and output.” 220
The rule of Trial Lawyers as applied to independent contractors engaging in
work stoppages for higher remuneration creates a seemingly bright line:
regardless of one’s views of the broad fictitiousness of independent contractor
designations throughout much of the economy, under current antitrust law,
independent contractors risk work stoppages being designated by courts as
illegal boycotts. 221 For worker advocates, the remedy to the problem will
ultimately be pushing for amended statutory employee definitions across the
economy to make misclassification of employees as independent contractors
significantly more difficult. 222
Antitrust scrutiny may appear irrelevant in cases of “pure” protest work
stoppages, for example against Google for sexual harassment; or irrelevant in
connection with safety-related work stoppages like those emerging from

219. In other words, the conduct was a “per se” violation of the antitrust laws.
Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms – either as a per se violation or as
a violation of the rule of reason. Section 1 of the Sherman Act characterizes certain business
practices as per se violations. A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the
practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in
the practice. Some business practices, however, at times constitute anticompetitive behavior
and at other times encourage competition within the market. For these cases, the court
applies a “totality of the circumstances test” and asks whether the challenged practice
promotes or suppresses market competition. Courts often find intent and motive relevant in
predicting future consequences during a rule of reason analysis.
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, LII, ANTITRUST, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust [https://per
ma.cc/K72W-7XN6].
220. See Sup. Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423.
221. Id. See also Paul, supra note 48, at 1043 (describing “Trial Lawyers as an instance of the
neoclassical price-fixing logic applied to worker collective action that looms as a serious threat, if
not an outright blockade, to much nontraditional worker organizing, particularly on the part of
independent contractor workers not affiliated with a traditional labor organization”).
222. In a bill passed by the House of Representatives in February 2020, the NLRA would be
amended as follows:
“An individual performing any service shall be considered an employee (except as provided
in the previous sentence) and not an independent contractor, unless. . . (A) the individual is
free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both
under the contract for the performance of service and in fact; (B) the service is performed
outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and (C) the individual is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.”
H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/2474/text [https://perma.cc/282E-Y7PE]. This statutory criteria, known as the “ABC test,” has
been embraced by a number of states in various employment contexts, most notably under
California law. See Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35, 39 (Cal. 2018)
(holding that a putative employer suffers or permits a putative employee to work if it cannot
overcome three-part test for classifying workers as independent contractors).
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COVID-19 contexts. 223 A logical first reaction to the question might be that
workers engaging in the Google protest, for example, should not have been liable
under antitrust law because the work stoppage contained elements of speech or
expressive content. 224 As has been known throughout the history of labor law,
work stoppages often involve picketing or other attempts to communicate the
facts of a “labor” dispute and attempts to suppress the communication have
routinely drawn First Amendment scrutiny. 225 It might be argued that parallel
scrutiny should be undertaken in the context of application of antitrust liability
to non-employee work stoppages—indeed, this article will make this argument.
As Sanjukta Paul has shown, however, this First Amendment theory was dealt a
blow in Trial Lawyers. 226 There, the Court distinguished its storied opinion in
Claiborne Hardware by drawing a bright line between concerted boycotts (like
work stoppages) for one’s own advantage and those motivated by “the equal
respect and equal treatment to which [participants] were constitutionally
entitled.” 227 Trial Lawyers continued that the racial justice boycott in Claiborne
“was not intended ‘to destroy legitimate competition.’ . . . Equality and freedom
are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled over
within it.” 228 This nice phrase does nothing to clarify how its principle would
apply in practice to, for example, the Google work stoppage. A protest against
sexual harassment potentially seeks both personal advantage (to be personally
free of sexual harassment) and the collective good of ridding the workplace of
sexual harassment, both “preconditions of the free market, and not commodities
to be haggled over within it.” 229
Safety protests are similarly problematic. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
several news stories suggested that Instacart 230 workers were “striking” or
223. It is worth repeating that the issue in these scenarios is not whether workers are statutorily
protected—assuming arguendo a finding of non-employee status under relevant statutes they would
not be; rather, the question remains whether workers could be liable for such work stoppages under
antitrust law.
224. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911–912 (1982) (reversing on First
Amendment grounds the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion upholding lower courts’ imposition
of tort and state antitrust damages on various defendants participating in economic boycott of white
merchants to pressure for racial and civil rights in Claiborne County, Mississippi).
225. See generally Carlson v. Cal., 310 U.S. 106, 110–111 (1940).
226. Paul, supra note 48, at 1043 (arguing throughout that “an artificial distinction between the
‘economic’ and the ‘political’ keeps First Amendment protection for a classic workers’ boycott at
bay.”)
227. Fed. Trade Comm’n Superior Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. at 426.
228. Id. at 426–27.
229. Id.
230. According to Instacart’s web site, “[Its] services comprise a platform that presents you
with a set of one or more retailer virtual storefronts from which you can select goods for picking,
packing, and delivery by individual personal shoppers (‘Personal Shoppers’) to your location or, if
available, for you to pick up in-store. Picking, packing, or delivery services may be performed by
third parties including a retailer or third-party logistics provider (collectively, ‘Third Party
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preparing to do so. 231 One New York publication reporting on the story inquired,
“Is it really a strike if Instacart workers aren’t employees?” 232 According to
published reports, Instacart, which was already operating in 5500 cities in North
America, planned to “hire 300,000 ‘full-service shoppers,’ who are treated as
independent contractors, in North America over the next three months due to
increased demand spurred by the coronavirus pandemic. That would more than
double its current workforce of full-service shoppers.” 233
When the potential exists for hundreds of thousands of Instacart workers
“striking” over both “hazard pay” and, for example, provision of personal
protective equipment, a very difficult antitrust problem is presented that plainly
differs in scope from antitrust disputes involving pockets of professional or trade
workers that the Federal Trade Commission has occasionally prosecuted or
found problematic under antitrust law. 234 The “independent businessperson”
model seems both inaccurate and wholly inadequate in assessing this broad
Instacart/Gig economy problem. First, the independent businessperson model
seems factually inaccurate. It is simply difficult to accept the often-repeated
mantra that businesses like Instacart are “technology companies” only
incidentally involved in any particular industry. 235 It further strains the credulity

Providers’).” INSTACART TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.instacart.com/terms [https://perma.cc
/V69K-HCKC] (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
231. See Erik Ortiz, Some Instacart workers strike, others demand more as coronavirus alters
labor landscape, NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/someinstacart-workers-strike-others-demand-more-coronavirus-alters-labor-n1171521 [https://perma.
cc/manage/create?folder=7821]; Alexandra Olson and Mae Anderson, Some Instacart, Amazon
Workers Strike as Jobs Get Riskier, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2020-03-30/some-instacart-amazon-workersstrike-as-jobs-get-riskier.
232. Samantha Christmann, Is it Really a Strike if Instacart Workers Aren’t Employees?, THE
BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020) https://buffalonews.com/2020/03/30/is-it-really-a-strike-if-insta
cart-workers-arent-employees/./ [https://perma.cc/78DT-KWQC.].
233. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Instacart Plans to Hire 300,000 More Workers as Demand Surges
for Grocery Deliveries, CNN (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/23/tech/instacarthiring/index.html. [https://perma.cc/2DBZ-3RQG].
234. Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 810–13 (explaining that FTC has pursued and enforced
antitrust law against animal breeders, electricians, ice skating teachers, managers of commercial
and residential properties, music teachers, organists, public defenders [twice] and has investigated
truck drivers at several ports for seeking to organize for higher wages, reduced hours, and improved
working conditions). The actions appear to share in common some attempt by the involved groups
to improve remuneration.
235. Jacob Rosenberg, Gig Workers Are More Undervalued Than Ever Before. Tech
Companies Are Spending Like Crazy to Keep It That Way, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/04/gig-workers-are-more-undervalued-than-ever-be
fore-tech-companies-are-spending-like-crazy-to-keep-it-that-way/ [https://perma.cc/DV65-WH
FG] (“For their part, gig companies are doubling down on their opposition to [newly amended
California employment law], which dared to question one of the tenets of Silicon Valley: A business
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to accept that Instacart is comprised of hundreds of thousands of independent
businesspeople who might have come together on their own, but have done so
more efficiently through the serendipitous intervention of an “app.” 236
Furthermore, applying the independent businessperson model of antitrust law to
safety-related work stoppages seems legally inadequate: it does not seem
compelled under the logic of cases like Trial Lawyers, or even much older cases
like Apex Hosiery v. Leader; 237 and it certainly does not respond to the looming
and muddling problem of a multiplicity of employee definitions throughout the
economy (though this is a criticism also applying to remuneration-based work
stoppages): as mentioned previously, one may be an employee in California but
not an employee under the National Labor Relations Board definition. 238 Courts
should be very hesitant about imposing severe antitrust sanctions where the
statutory predicates for liability—here, the employee definition—are vague. As
Justice Gorsuch said recently in his concurrence in Sessions v. Dimaya, 239 fair
notice of the law’s demands is required under the Constitution. 240 Justice
Gorsuch has also opined that “void for vagueness” concerns arise in civil no less
than criminal contexts,
[C]ivil laws regularly impose penalties far more severe than those found in many
criminal statutes . . . Ours is a world filled with more and more civil laws bearing
more and more extravagant punishments. Today’s ‘civil’ penalties include
confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow
homes to be taken, remedies that strip persons of their professional licenses and

is not defined by the service it provides but by its technology—its platform.”); see also O’Connor
v. Uber Tech., Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Uber is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a ‘technology company’
because it uses computers and robots to manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a
‘technology company’ because it uses modern irrigation techniques to grow its sugar cane.
Indeed, very few (if any) firms are not technology companies if one focuses solely on how
they create or distribute their products. If, however, the focus is on the substance of what
the firm actually does (e.g., sells cab rides, lawn mowers, or sugar), it is clear that Uber is
most certainly a transportation company, albeit a technologically sophisticated one.”)
236. Katy Steinmetz, Lawsuit Claims Instacart ‘Personal Shoppers’ Should Be Classified as
Employees, TIME (Mar. 18, 2015), https://time.com/3748438/instacart-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc
/ZGU5-5FU2] (quoting plaintiff’s argument: “[There is] this narrative that I think companies like
Instacart and Uber and Lyft want to become more mainstream . . . that somehow these antiquated
laws don’t apply to these types of work relationships. And frankly it’s ludicrous. Just because a
worker is directed and controlled by an algorithm that comes through a phone as opposed to a
foreman doesn’t do anything to change the fundamental relationship of employment.”).
237. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
238. See WEIL, supra note 153; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 163; see NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, http://www.nlrb.gov/strikes [https://perma.cc/5L2P6U3B.] (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
239. 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018).
240. Id. at 1228.
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livelihoods, and the power to commit persons against their will indefinitely.
Some of these penalties are routinely imposed and are routinely graver than
those associated with misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher than the
punishment for felonies. And not only are ‘punitive civil sanctions . . . rapidly
expanding,’ they are ‘sometimes more severely punitive than the parallel
criminal sanctions for the same conduct.’ 241

Given the civil and criminal severity of antitrust penalties, heightening the
stakes of independent contractor misclassification beyond that which might be
encountered in other areas of law, and the increasing ambiguity of the employee
definition under federal and state law, the application of antitrust liability to
ordinary citizens should give courts great pause. 242
If an arrangement of “independent businesspersons” is found to be a
violation of the Sherman Act, liability for individuals who are employees under
state law seems problematic. In First Amendment contexts, “[f]or liability to be
imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to
further those illegal aims.” 243 A court must judge this intent “according to the
strictest law.” 244 It would be hard to derive intent to violate antitrust law from a
worker’s good faith belief that she possessed employee status and was therefore
exempted from a duty to comply with antitrust law. Of course, this presupposes
the existence of a First Amendment problem. Some expressive or associative
interest must accompany the work stoppage. Outside the context of independent
contractor work stoppages for improvements in remuneration, however, Trial
Lawyers does not deny First Amendment protection of all non-employee
concerted action (including work stoppages). 245 This antitrust liability limitation
is consistent with the Court’s older opinion in Apex Hosiery v. Leader:
…that [conduct] activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton
Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit
in all of them is recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police
interstate transportation, or to afford a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable
under state law, and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short,
both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity,
such as to “monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its
would-be purchasers.” 246

Antitrust law is not, in other words, a generic enforcer of commerce wrongs.
At all events, First Amendment interpretive difficulties in this area should be
241. Id. at 1229 (internal citations omitted).
242. See Steinbaum, supra note 197, at 57.
243. Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added)).
244. Id. (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 919).
245. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 911–912.
246. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940).
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avoided. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 247 a labor speech case in which the
Court declined to find peaceful, but arguably “secondary,” union leafletting
unlawful under the NLRA, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress.” 248 Similarly, in the context of work stoppages by nonemployees—particularly where the stoppages contain strong expressive
components, seek workplace safety, and do not directly seek an increase in
remuneration—courts have no good reason to aggravate statutory antitrust
vagueness or risk running afoul of the First Amendment in service of a volatile
Gig economy that Congress could not possibly have foreseen during its
deliberations on the Sherman Act.
III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ON
WORK STOPPAGES
Returning to the realm of employees rather than non-employee workers, the
article now discusses the potential impact of private arbitration on the right of
non-union employees to engage in work stoppages. In American labor law—the
body of labor relations law applicable to unionized workplaces 249—the
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration has occupied an almost hallowed
position. 250 Under the Steelworkers’ Trilogy, 251 arbitration is a matter of
collective bargaining agreements and the parties—employers and unions—need
not arbitrate unless they have agreed to do so; 252 courts, not arbitrators, decide
whether parties have agreed to arbitrate, unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise. 253 Arbitrators, not courts, decide underlying
claims on their merits under applicable collective bargaining agreements, even
if those claims appear frivolous to a given court; and if collective bargaining
agreements contain arbitration clauses, particular employment disputes are
presumed arbitrable. 254 Arbitration is not to be denied unless an arbitration
clause positively cannot be interpreted as covering a dispute. In other words,
247. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
248. Id. at 575.
249. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018)
250. See generally Benjamin Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 41 (1967).
251. Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US 593 (1960).
252. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. at 577–78, 582; Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S .at 566, 568.
253. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 582–583. See Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc.,
406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241 (1962), overruled
in part on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
254. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568–69 (footnote omitted).
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doubts are resolved in favor of coverage. 255 Where unions and employers have
entered into collective bargaining agreements containing grievance-arbitration
provisions, the NLRB does not, absent unusual circumstances, investigate cases
alleging violations of the NLRA, either before or after an arbitration over the
dispute. 256 Although these NLRB arbitration-deferral rules slightly change from
time-to-time depending on the political makeup of the NLRB, 257 the general
outline, which is applicable only in unionized workplaces governed by collective
bargaining agreements with a grievance process culminating in binding
arbitration, has never been successfully challenged. 258
Another longstanding principle of labor law is that “bargaining unit” 259
employees may not lawfully engage in work stoppages if the collective
bargaining agreement governing their workplace forbids it under a “no strike”
pledge. 260 Assuming that an underlying work dispute is arbitrable under a
collective bargaining agreement, violation of the no-strike pledge, thereby
evading arbitration, renders the work stoppage subject to federal court
injunction. 261 When issued, such injunctions typically both suspend the work
stoppage and compel arbitration of the underlying dispute. 262 Furthermore, the
general rule is that, where a work dispute is arbitrable, a pledge not to engage in
a work stoppage over the dispute is implied. 263
However, the arbitral principles just discussed do not, and could not, apply
outside of a unionized workplace because they presume the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a recognized, or
certified, exclusive representative of a majority of the employer’s employees. 264
In that very specific context there are a set of policy rationales justifying
255. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83.
256. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B 837, 841–42 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B 1080, 1081–82 (1955).
257. See Memorandum GC 19-03 from General Counsel of N.L.R.B (December 28, 2018).
258. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
259. The parties to a collective bargaining agreement are an employer and a union representing
a bargaining unit—or legally permissible and selected or designated grouping of employees—in a
carefully defined workplace. Saipan Hotel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that Board unit determinations are based on common interest of employees and are rarely
to be disturbed).
260. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 237–38, 248–49 (1970).
261. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976).
262. Id. at 405–06, 407-08, 412–13 (declining to issue injunction for violation of a no strike
provision where it was unclear that strike was motivated by an arbitrable grievance).
263. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974) (“[A]
contractual commitment to submit disagreements to final and binding arbitration gives rise to an
implied obligation not to strike over such disputes.”) (citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour,
369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962)).
264. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (“In their
selection of a bargaining representative, § 9(a) of the Wagner Act guarantees employees freedom
of choice and majority rule.”) (internal citations omitted).
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enforcement of no-strike pledges in favor of arbitration. First, the courts “went
a long way towards making arbitration the central institution in the
administration of collective bargaining contracts.” 265 Next, “the unavailability
of equitable relief [i.e., injunctions] in the arbitration context [would present] a
serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary
establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes[.]” 266
Given the cabining of these rules in the NLRA context, it may not be apparent
what they could possibly have to do with this section’s focus on the rights of
non-union employees. Simply put, there is reason to think that some of these
labor arbitration principles could be exported to non-union employment
arbitration.
According to the Current Population Study of the Bureau of Census for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 6.2% of private sector employees in the United States
are union members, while 7.1% of private sector employees are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement. 267 In 1973, very close in time to when Boy’s
Markets was decided, 268 union membership in the United States stood at about
24%. Paralleling this retrogression, work stoppages at large employers began
declining in the mid-1970s, and strikes at both large and small companies peaked
in the late 1980s and underwent a sharp decline thereafter. 269 Thus, the overall
risk of work stoppages seemed to have been declining until recently, when the
number of work stoppages began trending upwards. 270 In other words, present
day union density continues to be very low while work stoppages seem to be
increasing.
As the foregoing trend has been unfolding, the number of non-union
employees covered by private arbitration agreements has simultaneously been
accelerating rapidly. As John Bickerman recently wrote,
In 1992, the year after the initial Supreme Court arbitration ruling [applying the
Federal Arbitration Act to employment contracts], the percentage of employees
subject to arbitration stood at two percent. By the early 2000’s, that percentage
had risen to almost a quarter of the non-union workforce. Drawing upon a
nationally representative sample of non-union employers from a survey . . .,
mandatory arbitration now covers 56 percent of the non-union labor force. And
265. Boys Markets, 389 U.S. at 252 (internal citations omitted).
266. Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted).
267. See Barry Hirsch and David MacPherson, UNIONSTATS, http://unionstats.com/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2021).
268. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 235.
269. Kate Bahn, The Once and Future Role of Strikes in Ensuring U.S. Worker Power,
EQUITABLEGROWTH (Aug. 21, 2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-ofstrikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/ [https://perma.cc/LM3F-SE4Z].
270. See Shierholz & Poydock, supra note 24; see also Abigail Abrams, The Number of U.S.
Workers Involved in a Strike in 2018 Was the Highest Since 1986, TIME (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://time.com/5525512/american-workers-strikes-bureau-labor-statistics [https://perma.cc/8Z2
A-X8A8.].
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among employers with 1,000 or more employees, a staggering almost twothirds, or 65.1 percent, of companies have given their employees no option but
to adjudicate their claims before an arbitrator. Translated to the non-union labor
force, over 60 million workers in non-union private sector jobs have been denied
access to the courts, where research has shown their claims would fare better
than in arbitration. 271

The rapid growth of non-union arbitration at first blush has nothing to do
with the policies of the NLRA. Yet, a primary objective of labor law is the
elimination of industrial strife. 272 Arbitration is a favored means under federal
labor law to achieve that objective. 273 What happens when the non-union sector
of the economy decreases in size? What happens when the use of arbitration in
the workplace increases? Industrial strife is being experienced in non-union
workplaces and private arbitration could be utilized to reduce the strife. From
each of those premises, it seems a short step for courts to insist that non-union
employees be held to their bargain to resolve work disputes through arbitration
rather than through work stoppages. Such a freedom-of-contract principle
guided the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boy’s Markets. 274
Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has even previously
enforced arbitration agreements in which unions and employers agreed that
bargaining unit members must arbitrate non-NLRA statutory claims. 275 More
recently, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 276 the Supreme Court stated that § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act “does not express approval or disapproval of
arbitration. It does not mention class or collective action procedures. It does not
even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone accomplish that
271. John Bickerman, Increase in Workers Subject to Arbitration Coincides with Supreme
Court Rulings, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation
/committees/alternative-dispute-resolution/practice/2020/increase-in-workers-subject-to-arbitra
tion-coincides-with-supreme-court-rulings/ [https://perma.cc/4ANS-SKT3.].
272. Earle K. Shawe, The Role of the Wagner Act in Preventing Industrial Strife, 32 VA. L.
REV. 95, 98–100 (reviewing the history of extremely frequent strikes before passage of the NLRA).
273. Office and Professional Employees International Prof’l Emp. Int’l Union, Local 2 v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 724 F.2d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“It cannot be gainsaid that federal
policy favors the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration . . . We would startle no
one by recognizing arbitration as a preferred method to resolve industrial strife quickly and
inexpensively.”).
274. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 252–53 (emphasizing the union
“freely undertook” obligation to arbitrate disputes).
275. Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257 (2009)
(“As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration
provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the
employer. Courts generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange. ‘Judicial
nullification of contractual concessions . . . is contrary to what the Court has recognized as
one of the fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act—freedom of
contract’”).
276. 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018).
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much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.” 277 The culmination of
this logic might be that an individual employee under freedom of contract
principles should be able to agree with an employer not to engage in a work
stoppage.
Consider the way in which the Court framed the issues at play in the three
consolidated cases collectively making up Epic Systems: “Should employees and
employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved
through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to
bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with
their employers?” 278 Why would that logic not apply to work stoppages, or to
any collective right? The objection to that logic is merely reflexive: individual
employees should not be compelled to arbitrate because they possess concerted
rights to engage in work stoppages under the NLRA. 279 However, the employees
in Epic Systems appear to possess § 7 rights to concertedly bring grievances to
their employers. Through the facility of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court
upheld the right of the employer to condition employment on waiver of
collective rights. This seems very hard to distinguish from a Yellow Dog
contract 280 and its limiting principle is at best unclear.
The NLRB, in a leading arbitration case pre-dating Epic Systems, grappled
with similar problems with a strong focus upon its labor law expertise. In D.R.
Horton, Inc., 281 a superintendent claimed that his employer had deprived him,
and a class of similarly situated superintendents, of statutory protections under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 282 When the superintendent’s counsel provided
notice to the employer of an intent to file a class action suit in connection with
the alleged FLSA violations, the employer’s counsel “replied that [the
superintendent’s counsel] had failed to give an effective notice of intent to
arbitrate, citing the language in the [involved arbitration agreement] that bars
arbitration of collective claims.” 283
[The superintendent] filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the General
Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
277. Id. at 1612, 1624.
278. Id. at 1619.
279. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (2018).
280. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. L. REV. 1017, 1036–1037 (1996)
(“Like the yellow dog contracts of the past, the new mandatory arbitration provisions are
often imposed on workers without even the illusion of bargaining or consent. They are
designed by employers unilaterally and given to employees at the time of hire or inserted
in employee handbooks, without mention of their existence and without discussion as to
their terms.”).
281. 357 N.L.R.B 2277, granting enforcement in part, reversing in part Horton v. NLRB, 737
F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) abrogated Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,138 S.Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018).
282. Id. at 2277.
283. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

LABOR VISCERALITY?

163

by maintaining the [arbitration agreement] provision stating that the arbitrator
“may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not have the authority
to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a
group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding.” 284

In finding a violation of the NLRA, the NLRB argued “[a]fter all, if the
Respondent’s employees struck in order to induce the Respondent to comply
with the FLSA, that form of concerted activity would clearly have been
protected.” 285 However, the critical issue in D.R. Horton was not whether the
superintendents’ concerted litigation would otherwise have been protected under
the NLRA; rather, the issue was whether finding restrictions on collective
actions unlawful under the NLRA would conflict with the Federal Arbitration
Act. 286
The NLRB argued in D.R. Horton that the collective industrial peace
rationale was simply incompatible with the individual contract policies
embedded in the Federal Arbitration Act—leaving to one side the large issue of
whether those policies were ever meant to apply to employment contracts 287—
and that the NLRA, enacted in 1935, impliedly repealed—as the more recent of
the statutes—conflicting Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) policies enacted in
1925. 288 Justice Gorsuch, however, writing for the majority in Epic Systems, said
“[t]he NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain
collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum.” 289

284. Id.
285. Id. at 2279.
286. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B 2277, 2283. As the NLRB noted in responding to an
internal memorandum prepared by a prior General Counsel of the agency, arguing for a broad right
of waiver, “[b]ased on the logic of [the internal memorandum], an employer would be privileged
to secure prospective individual waivers of all future Section 7 activity, including joining a union
and engaging in collective bargaining.” Id. And, one might add to the list, work stoppages.
287. Id. at 2284, n. 20 (“It seems fair to say, if immaterial to the Court’s construction of the
FAA, that the legislative history contains no discussion evincing a congressional intent to bring
employment contracts of any sort under the statute.”)
288. Id. at 2285. As the Supreme Court later stated in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,
337 (1944):
Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what
their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the
National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the
contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to
forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement. “The
Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with
the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.” . . . Wherever private contracts conflict with
its functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility (internal
citation omitted).
289. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
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Despite this cramped reading of § 7 of the NLRA, 290 the statement does not on
its surface threaten wholesale FAA invasion of the NLRA—it evokes images
only of the mode of “trying” legal disputes in a courtroom-like setting. Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion steadily becomes more alarming, however. In response to the
argument that, even if employees’ rights to file grievances collectively—the
precise issue in Epic Systems—do not directly involve employees’ rights to
organize unions, they may involve the right of employees to engage in other
“concerted activities for the purpose of [other] mutual aid or protection.” 291
Justice Gorsuch said:
The employees direct our attention to the term “other concerted activities for the
purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.” This catchall term, they say, can
be read to include class and collective legal actions. But the term appears at the
end of a detailed list of activities speaking of “self-organization,” “form[ing],
join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations,” and “bargain[ing] collectively.”
And where, as here, a more general term follows more specific terms in a list,
the general term is usually understood to “‘embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’” 292

This alarming statement effectively cabins the collective rights of non-union
employees to an unspecified degree. The “detailed list” of activities to which
Justice Gorsuch referred apply effortlessly to union organizational activities, but
not so effortlessly to non-union employee concerted activities of other types. 293
The challenge will be determining what else might lay outside of “form[ing],
join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations,” and “bargain[ing] collectively.”
Taken to one logical conclusion, it might be possible to conclude that
“nonorganizational” non-union work stoppages are not on Justice Gorsuch’s list.
If these work stoppages are not on the official list of protected activities, and if
290. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (observing that employees’
rights extend beyond union or even collective bargaining contexts).
291. Id.
292. Epic Systems Corp, 138 S.Ct. at 1625.
293. It is unclear, for example, how the construct squares with any of the social media “mutual
aid or protection” law. In a non-union workplace concertedly clicking on a Facebook “like” seems
worlds apart from even “self-organization” to say nothing of the more structured activities of
forming, joining, or assisting a labor organization. See Ariana R. Levinson, Solidarity on Social
Media, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 303, 320 (2016) (discussing inconsistent applications of mutual
aid or protection law to social media contexts). The discussion here could go on at great length
given the wide variety of concerted activity that has been protected outside of a union or organizing
context on a “mutual aid or protection” theory. Perhaps some space for non-union concerted activity
remains unthreatened through increased deployment of the term “self-organization.” But the many
battles over the decades that have been fought out on broad “mutual aid or protection” grounds may
not be assimilable to the narrower idea of “self-organization.” See e.g. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437
U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (“[Congress chose] . . . as the language of § 7 makes clear, to protect concerted
activities for the somewhat broader purpose of ‘mutual aid or protection,’ as well as for the narrower
purposes of ‘self-organization’ and ‘collective bargaining.’”).
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it is the general policy of the United States to encourage industrial peace, it may
be perfectly sensible to conclude that employers and employees, possessing
freedom of contract, are free to agree that work disputes will be dealt with
exclusively through arbitration and never through work stoppages. After all, it
would be an “individual” agreement. Suppose an individual employee
nonetheless engaged in a work stoppage in derogation of an agreement not to do
so. One might appeal to the Norris-LaGuardia Act as preventing such a work
stoppage from being enjoined. In Boys Markets, however, the Supreme Court
adopted a Railway Labor Act holding in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R. Co. 294 that,
…a strike in violation of a statutory arbitration duty was not the type of situation
to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive, that an important federal
policy was involved in the peaceful settlement of disputes through the statutorily
mandated arbitration procedure, that this important policy was imperiled if
equitable remedies were not available to implement it, and hence that NorrisLaGuardia’s policy of nonintervention by the federal courts should yield to the
overriding interest in the successful implementation of the arbitration
process. 295

The Supreme Court has, in other words, already crossed federal statutory lines
to advance the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration. The court at
one time strongly expressed that labor arbitration could not defeat the NLA’s
protection of peaceful work stoppages from labor injunctions when it said:
Nor can we agree with the argument made in this Court that the . . .
[Steelworkers’ Trilogy 296] requires us to reconsider and overrule the action of
Congress in refusing to repeal or modify the controlling commands of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. To the extent that those cases relied upon the proposition
that the arbitration process is “a kingpin of federal labor policy,” we think that
proposition was founded not upon the policy predilections of this Court but upon
what Congress said and did when it enacted s 301. Certainly, we cannot accept
any suggestion which would undermine those cases by implying that the Court
went beyond its proper power and itself “forged . . . a kingpin of federal labor
policy” inconsistent with that section and its purpose. Consequently, we do not
see how cases implementing the purpose of s 301 can be said to have freed this
Court from its duty to give effect to the plainly expressed congressional purpose
with regard to the continued application of the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 297

A mere eight years later the Court swept that principle aside and allowed
arbitration to overcome the NLA by authorizing courts to suspend peaceful work

294.
295.
296.
297.

353 U.S. 30 (1957).
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1970)
AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 US 643, 648 (1986).
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 213 (1962).
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stoppages in favor of labor arbitration. 298 Once a private, individual employee
agreement not to engage in work stoppages is deemed enforceable, the NorrisLaGuardia Act may become irrelevant because the Federal Arbitration Act
contains its own provisions to compel arbitration. 299
One might in the final analysis object that if an individual employee
generally agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration but did not explicitly agree
not to engage in work stoppages, a no work stoppage pledge could not be
implied. In the domain of labor law, however, this argument was rejected; except
in situations where the right to engage in a work stoppage is specifically
reserved, a pledge to arbitrate is implied. 300
The foregoing argument requires a series of improbable leaps and bounds,
but none of those leaps seem more improbable than the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp 301 that applied the Federal
Arbitration Act to employment law in the first place. As Justice Stevens wrote
in his dissenting opinion in that case:
When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legislator who voted for it
expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between parties of
unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of the
employment relationship. In recent years, however, the Court “has effectively
rewritten the statute”, and abandoned its earlier view that statutory claims were
not appropriate subjects for arbitration . . . Although I remain persuaded that it
erred in doing so, the Court has also put to one side any concern about the
inequality of bargaining power between an entire industry, on the one hand, and
an individual customer or employee, on the other . . . Until today, however, the
Court has not read § 2 of the FAA as broadly encompassing disputes arising out
of the employment relationship. 302

When it comes to this Court and this statute (and apparently several Congresses),
is any Federal Arbitration Act leap too large? In the end, it may be as pointless
to ask whether private arbitrations over potentially low-impact work stoppages
has anything to do with broad risks of “industrial strife” as it is to wonder how
unreported private arbitral awards could possibly remedy the socially deep racial
and gender injuries that our employment laws were meant to address.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right to engage in work stoppages, so firmly recognized under
traditional labor law, is likely to encounter stressors and qualifications that were
unknown and perhaps unknowable to the original architects of labor and
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252, 254.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018).
See Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at 381.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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employment law. The changes may cause us to rethink the original policy
rationales behind the original establishment of the right. The initial instinct of
the common law was to deem employee concerted activities unlawful criminal
conspiracies. 303 To a certain kind of legal mind, the approach possesses the
appeal of simplicity. That approach was nonetheless abandoned and we need to
rediscover why. 304
Antitrust law, as applied to non-employee workers, could come perilously
close to reestablishing much earlier ideas of labor criminality. Work stoppage
intermittency and compulsory arbitration backed by court injunctions—with its
organizational-squelching historical parallel under the old labor law regime—
would remove legal protection from work stoppages but not criminalize them.
Taking a step away from the din, it is hard to ignore the astonishing
transformation that has occurred. While scholars like Marion Crain and Kenneth
Matheny rightly press the divide between “business unionism” and “social
justice unionism,” and contend that “new” labor law is in reality “old” labor
law 305—a proposition that can be easily embraced—foundational legal terrain
has cataclysmically shifted beneath our feet. The discussion now may not be
centered on the boundaries or vision of the labor movement, but rather on
whether any worker anywhere will possess any right following the onslaught on
the employee definition (and its antitrust implications) and the march of the
Federal Arbitration Act through the employment statute book. As a lawyer, one
may strenuously object. But workers are likely to engage in work stoppages.

303. See Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826, 832 (1926).
304. See Michael C. Duff, The Cowboy Code Meets the Smash Mouth Truth: Meditations on
Worker Incivility, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 961, 971 (2015) (discussing labor rights as a matter of worker
self-defense).
305. Marion Crain & Kenneth Matheny, The ‘New’ Labor Regime, 126 YALE L.J. F. 478, 478–
79 (2017).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

168

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:115

